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NOTE

PLEADING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE: THE PROPRIETY
OF INCONSISTENCY

Of fortune no man tastes his fill.
While pointing envy notes his store,
And tongues extol his happiness,
Man surfeited will hunger still.
For who grows weary of success,
Or turns good fortune from his door
Bidding her trouble him no more?
-Aeschylus1
INTRODUCTION

Were epitaphs to attach to the grave markers of certain recently
fallen political careers, perhaps none would be more appropriate than
Aeschylus' cynical commentary in Agamemnon. Once prominent leaders, these were men who had somehow fallen victim to both their own
tragic flaws and the controversial undercover tactics of the very government of which they were a part. The political falls of such men as
Messrs. Kelly,2 Lederer,3 Myers' and Williams,5 to name but a few, 6 by
no means marked the :first time in our history where respected and
trusted public leaders had been forced to resign "their offices amid allegations of scandal and public wrongdoing. Indeed, the annals of even
our most recent history are replete with examples both tragic and contemptible. 7 What distinguishes this most recent episode, however, is
1. AEscHYLus, Agamemnon, in THE 0RESTEIAN TRILOGY 88-89 (P. Vellacott trans.
1978).

2. Representative Richard Kelly (R.-Fla.).
3. Representative Raymond Lederer (D.-Penn.).
4. Representative Michael Myers (D.-Penn.).
5. Senator Harrison Williams (D.-N.J.).
6. See, e.g., Pear, Judge Overturns Abscam Conviction of Ex-Legislator, N.Y. Times,
May 15, 1982, at 1, col. 4; Fried, Williams is Given 3 years and a Fine in Abscam Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Maitland, 7 Defendants Lose Bid for New
Trial on Abscam Counts, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1981, at 1, col. 2; Fried, Williams is
Guilty on all Nine Counts in Abscam Inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1981, at 1, col. 5;
Pear, Ex-Representative Kelly Convicted of Abscam Bribery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1981,
at 1, col. 4; Fried, Rep. Lederer Found Guilty of Bribery in Abscam Case, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 10, 1981, at 27, col. 5.
7. An unfortunately realistic account of some of the most infamous falls from grace is
1025
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the manner in which the denouement came to be effected. While a recounting of the events leading to and the results stemming from the
Abscam scandal is clearly beyond the scope of this note,8 no such recapitulation is necessary to refresh our all too vivid memories of what
Abscam in fact represented-the increasing prominence of undercover
governmental investigative tactics and a resurgence of the entrapment
controversy.
In what remains the recent wake of Abscam, it is only too apparent that both public and judicial sensitivity to the entrapment issue is
likely to intensify.9 With this heightened focus will doubtless come a
renewed attention to aspects of the entrapment defense which have yet
to be definitively resolved. While the Supreme Court has established10
and thrice reaffirmed11 its substantive interpretation of the entrapment
defense, a number of equally important procedural matters have heretofore escaped its review. The focus of this note, therefore, will be an
evaluation of one such procedural matter, viz., the availability of the
entrapment defense where the assertion of that defense is inconsistent
with the defendant's denial of guilt. 12
revealed in a series of articles by Milton Gould, commencing with Gould, A Homily on
Cause & Effect of 'Hubris' in Foley Square, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1981, at 1, col. 2. Among
those whose ignominious fates are depicted are James Landis (Gould, James M. Landis-Classic Case of Hubris, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 1981 at 1, col. 2), Alger Hiss (Gould, U.S.
v. Alger Hiss-Another Case of Hubris, (pts. 1 & 2), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1982, at 1, col. 2;
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 2), J. Vincent Keogh, (Gould, The Hubrists-A Peerage
of Stupidity, (pts. 1-3), N.Y.L.J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 1, col. 2; N.Y.L.J., Apr. 20, 1982, at 1,
col. 2; N.Y.L.J., Apr. 21, 1982, at 1, col. 2), and Seymour Thaler, (Gould, The
Hubrists-A Peerage of Stupidity, (pts. 1-3), N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1982, at 1, col. 2;
N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1982, at 1, col. 2; N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1982, at 1, col. 2).
8. See generally Brill, Entrapped?, The American Lawyer, Jan. 1983, at 1, 73-80;
Maitland, At the Heart of the Abscam Debate, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
9. See Maitland, Abscam Inquiry: Focus on Targeting, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1982, at
10, col. 3; Maitland, At the Heart of the Abscam Debate, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1982, § 6
(Magazine), at 22.
10. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), discussed infra notes 26-35
and accompanying text.
11. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), discussed infra notes 63-82
and accompanying text; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), discussed infra
notes 49-62 and accompanying text; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), discussed infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
12. More precisely, the issue to be examined concerns the nature and propriety of
what has come to be known as the "inconsistency rule." Essentially, the rule reflects a
procedural doctrine which seeks to bar a criminal defendant from asserting defenses at
trial deemed to be logically or factually inconsistent, e.g., "I didn't commit the crime, but
if I did, I was entrapped." For various linguistic formulations of the rule, see infra notes
127 & 128 and accompanying text. For a discussion of inconsistent defenses other than
entrapment, see infra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
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Part 11 3 will briefly survey the genesis and evolution of the entrapment defense in the federal courts. Part IP'' will explore the general
theories and availability of inconsistent pleadings and defenses in
other areas of our criminal and civil jurisprudence. Part m111 will then
set forth the nature of the debate in the specific context of the inconsistent entrapment defense, surveying the various circuit courts' positions which may be summarized as permissive, restrictive, or quasi-restrictive. Finally, Part IV16 will represent a prescriptive attempt to
articulate support speaking to the ultimate propriety of inconsistent
defenses.
I.

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE17

The history of entrapment is an ancient one, "first interposed in
Paradise: 'The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.' " 18 It is not surprising that the defense ultimately made its way to the federal courts, alas,
13. Infra notes 17-84 and accompanying text.
14. Infra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
15. Infra notes 122-246 and accompanying text.
16. Infra notes 247-87 and accompanying text.
17. This section's cursory review of the development of the entrapment defense is by
no means intended to be exhaustive. Rather, it is designed only to familiarize the uninitiated reader with the present state of the law and its development. For more detailed
discussions and analyses of the entrapment controversy, see generally DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1
U.S.F.L. REV. 243 (1967); Dix, Undercouer Inuestigations and Police Rulemaking, 53
TEx. L. REV. 203, 246-86 (1975); Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Prouocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1098-1115 (1951); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942); Murchison,
The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Modern Deuelopments, 47 Miss. L.J. 573
(1976); O'Connor, Entrapment Versus Due Process: A Solution to the Problem of the
Criminal Conuiction Obtained by Law Enforcement Misconduct, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
35 (1978); Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J.
39; Park, The Entrapment Controuersy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976); Ranney, The Entrapment Defense-What Hath the Model Penal Code Wrought?, 16 DuQ. L. REv. 157
(1977-1978).
18. Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) (quoting
Genesis 3:13). In rejecting the entrapment defense, the court seemed comfortable in relying on what it doubtlessly perceived to be the ultimate authority:
That defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we
may form, or whatever judgment pass upon the character or conduct of the
tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield crime or give indemnity to
the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say
christian ethics, it never will.
Id. While "the great Lawgiver" has never been explicitly overruled, at least as to the
facts upon which His judgment was rendered, it is safe to say that entrapment has established itself as a viable legal defense in more modem times. For a discussion of cases
recognizing the validity of the defense, see infra notes 26-82 and accompanying text.

1028

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

only to prove initially unavailing. United States v. Whittier, 19 while
rejecting the entrapment defense, managed to anticipate the modern
day debate over subjective and objective theories of entrapment.20 A
concurring opinion suggested:
It must be conceded that contrivances to induce crime (the
contriver confederating for the purpose with the criminal) are
most rigidly scrutinized by the courts, even when the contrivances are lawful in themselves. But when the contrivances are
of an unlawful character, should courts not be even more
strict?
No court should, even to aid in detecting a supposed offender, lend its countenance to a violation of positive law, or to
contrivances for inducing a person to commit a crime. Although a violation of law by one person in order to detect an
offender will not excuse the latter, or be available to him as a
defense, yet resort to unlawful means is not to be encouraged.
When the guilty intent to commit has been formed, any one
may furnish opportunities, or even lend assistance, to the criminal, with the commendable purpose of exposing and punishing
. 21
h rm.
It was not until 1915 that the first successful entrapment defense
was raised. In Woo Wai v. United States, 22 the Ninth Circuit reversed
defendants' convictions for a conspiracy to bring illegal aliens into the
United States. The court premised its holding2 3 on two theories, suggesting not only that the defendants lacked any predisposition to commit the crime,24 but that it would be against public policy to permit
law enforcement officers to induce the commission of crime by others.25
The stage thus set, the Supreme Court's first major pronouncement was soon to follow. In Sorrells v. United States, 26 a doctrinally
19. 28 F. Cas. 591, 594 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688).
20. See infra notes 26-83 and accompanying text.
21. 28 F. Cas. at 594 (Treat, J., concurring).
22. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
23. Id. at 414-15. The court's holding was based on a finding that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that there was in fact a conspiracy to commit a criminal act within
the meaning of the statute. To the extent that "no violation of the law was to be accomplished by the act of the defendants, it follow[ed] that they could not be held for conspiracy to do that act." Id. at 415.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 415-16. For an excellent summary of the early growth of the entrapment
defense, see Orfield, supra note 17, at 39-43.
26. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The defendant in Sorrells had been charged on a two-count
indictment with possession and sale of whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition
Act. Id. at 438. A federal agent, posing as a tourist, managed to gain the confidence of
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divided Court set forth the theory of the defense and the terms of its
application. Upholding the availability of the defense, 27 the Court articulated what has come to be known as a subjective theory, focusing
on whether or not a defendant was predisposed to commit the criminal
act. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes explained that the
entrapment defense prohibited law enforcement officials from instigating a criminal act by persons "otherwise innocent in order to lure them
to its commission and to punish them.ms The critical inquiry, therefore, was "whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom
the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the
product of the creative activity of its own officials."29
In a concurring opinion, Justice Roberts advanced a strong case
for an alternative view of the nature of the entrapment defense. 80
While the "Hughes opinion viewed the entrapment defense as a protection for the otherwise innocent individual who was entrapped, and
as a collateral protection of the public from similar intrusions, Justice
Roberts saw the defense as protection of the government from itself,
with the collateral effect of excusing the entrapped individual."81 Specifically, Justice Roberts noted that the doctrine rests
on a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its
own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own
temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court
the defendant and persisted in asking the defendant if he could procure some liquor for
him. Not until a third request did the defendant capitulate and provide the zealous
agent with what he sought. Id. at 439-40. For a more detailed discussion of Sorrells, see
Note, Criminal Law-Entrapment: Sorrells v. United States, 13 B.U.L. REv. 293 (1933);
Note, Entrapment of Public Officers as a Defense Against Criminal Prosecution, 38
DICK. L. REV. 191 (1934); Note, Entrapment under the National Prohibition Act, 1 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 371 (1933); Note, Criminal Law-Defenses-Entrapment as Defense
under the General Issue, 46 HARV. L. REV. 848 (1933); Note, The Nature of the Defense
of Entrapment, 1 U. Cm. L. REV. 115 (1933); Note, Entrapment as Defense in Prosecution for Prohibition Violation, 42 YALE L.J. 803 (1933).
27. 287 U.S. at 452.
28. Id. at 448.
29. Id. at 451. The Chief Justice was careful to point out that "[i]t is well settled that
the fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or
facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprise." Id. at 441.
He noted, however, that "[a] different question is presented when the criminal design
originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in
order that they may prosecute." Id. at 442.
30. Id. at 453 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts' concurrence was joined by
Justices Brandeis and Stone. Id. at 459. Justice McReynolds dissented without opinion.
Id. at 453 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
31. Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of
Crime and the Entrapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254, 256 (1973).

1030

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

and of the court alone to protect itself and the government
from such prostitution of the criminal law.32
While Justice Roberts defined entrapment as "the conception and
planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer,"33 he could find it grounded on
no other theory than public policy, that is, the need to retain the purity and integrity of the law enforcement process. Justice Roberts observed that there was
common agreement that where a law officer envisages a crime,
plans it, and activates its commission by one not theretofore
intending its perpetration, for the sole purpose of obtaining a
victim through indictment, conviction and sentence, the consummation of so revolting a plan ought not to be permitted by
any self-respecting tribunal. . . . Public policy forbids such
sacrifice of decency.:"
In short, Justice Roberts would not permit the process of the courts
"to be used in aid of a scheme for the actual creation of a crime by
those whose duty it is to deter its commission. " 311
The Sorrells holding remained undisturbed in the Supreme Court
for nearly a quarter of a century. In 1958, when again presented with
the issue of entrapment in Sherman v. United States, 36 the Court declined to reassess its earlier ruling. In setting aside the petitioner's conviction for narcotics sales violations, Chief Justice Warren expressly reaffirmed the Court's position on entrapment as detailed in Sorrells,
specifically noting that "[t]he intervening years have in no way de32. 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 454.
34. Id. at 454-55. Compare Justice Roberts' view with that espoused by Justice Bran. deis dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1927):
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure
the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
35. 287 U.S. at 454 (Roberts J., concurring).
36. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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tracted from the principles underlying that decision." 37 In reaffirming
the Court's earlier holding, the Chief Justice reiterated the view of his
predecessor that "[e]ntrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct
was the 'product of the creative activity' of law-enforcement officials."38 Accordingly, the Court's focus would necessarily be directed to
the predisposition of a defendant to commit the crime with which he
had been charged. In language that would come to be quoted extensively, Chief Justice Warren reasoned that "[t]o determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."39 Toward this end, the accused would be "subjected to an 'appropriate and
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition' as bearing
on his claim of innocence.'~
The majority explicitly refused to alter its analysis to conform to
Justice Roberts' concurrence in Sorrells 41 despite strong urging by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion.42 Justice Frankfurter, dissatisfied with the basis of the Sorrells decision, argued strenuously for
"reexamination to achieve clarity of thought,"43 noting that "the prevailing theory of the Sorrells case ought not to be deemed the last
word.'' 44 Picking up on the Roberts concurrence, Justice Frankfurter
endorsed an objective focus, arguing that "[t]he courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the
proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted,
the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about the
conviction cannot be countenanced.''45 Indeed, he noted that
40

37. Id. at 372. The Chief Justice continued: "The function of law enforcement is the
prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does
not include the manufacturing of crime. • . . Congress could not have intended that its
statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations." Id.
38. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 451) (emphasis by the Sherman
Court).
39. 356 U.S. at 372.
40. Id. at 373 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 451). Ultimately, the
majority concluded that entrapment had been established as a matter of law and reversed the petitioner's conviction. 356 U.S. at 373.
41. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
42. 356 U.S. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan joined in the Frankfurter concurrence. Id.
43. Id. at 379.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 380. More particularly, Justice Frankfurter stated:
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power. For answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit
the crime originated with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal
conduct was the product of "the creative activity" of law-enforcement officials.

1032

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

a test that looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the
underlying reason for the defense of entrapment. No matter
what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to
criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estima~
tion of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society.46
Justice Frankfurter was unwilling to set forth with particularity the
proper benchmark by which government tactics were to be evaluated.47
Instead, the court was to fashion "as objective a test as the subject
matter permits,"48 leaving its application through condemnation of
reprehensible police conduct to a careful case-by-case approach. The
substance of an embellished Frankfurter analysis would be the basis of
the next entrapment case to reach the High Court.
More than a decade after the Sherman decision, United States v.
Russell49 renewed an entrapment dialogue among the members of the
Court. The split among the justices intensified as the doctrinal underpinnings of past concurring opinions now engendered dissents. Russell,
like Sherman, involved a disputed narcotics conviction,110 and provided
the Court with the vehicle to reaffirm its now entrenched view of the
foundation for the entrapment defense.
The essential question that emerged in Russell was whether or not
the entrapment defense could properly be attributed to constitutional
principles of due process. The Ninth Circuit, in expanding the traditional notion of entrapment, had held that the overinvolvement of law
enforcement officials in inducing the culpable acts of the defendant
represented "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the
criminal enterprise."111 It therefore grounded its theory of entrapment
"on fundamental concepts of due process and evince[d] the reluctance
Id. at 382.
46. Id. at 382-83.
47. Id. at 383-84. The present Burger Court also seems hesitant to define the limits of
proper government conduct. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
48. 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
49. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
50. Russell had been convicted of three counts of unlawful manufacture, sale, and
delivery of methamphetamine. Id. at 424. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction on
finding that an undercover agent had supplied an essential chemical for manufacturing
the drug and that there could not have been manufacture, delivery, or sale of the illicit
drug had it not been for the government's supply of the essential ingredient. Russell v.
United States, 459 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). It concluded
as a matter of law that "a defense to a criminal charge may be founded upon an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." 459 F.2d at 673.
51. 459 F.2d at 673.
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of the judiciary to countenance 'overzealous law enforcement.' " 112 In
refusing to elevate the defense of entrapment to constitutional status,
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Supreme Court majority, noted:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern. ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction,
the instant case is distinctly not of that breed. . . . The law
enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that
"fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice," mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.113
Despite leaving open at least the possibility of a constitutionally
grounded entrapment defense, Justice Rehnquist remained adamant in
the Court's continued adherence to the doctrine as announced in Sorrells and Sherman, 114 expressly rejecting any attempt to breathe judicial life into the minority views espoused by Justices Roberts and
Frankfurter.1111 For all practical purposes, the essential holding of Sorrells and the proper predicate for an entrapment defense therefore remained "intact. Once more, entrapment was established to be
a relatively limited defense . . . rooted, not in any authority of
the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to
have been "overzealous law enforcement," but instead in the
52. Id. at 674 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
53. 411 U.S. at 431-32 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 246 (1960)) (citation omitted).
Since the opinion in Russell, a number of courts have noted situations where the
"conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles" barred
the government from invoking judiciiil process to obtain a conviction. See, e.g., United
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378-80 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d
424, 427-30 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir.
1976); Willis v. United States, 530 F.2d 308, 312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838
(1976); United States v. Webster, 518 F.2d 987, 989-90 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
907 (1975); United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 377 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v.
Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1189-90 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd en bane, 673 F.2d 578, 601
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). But see United States v. Ward, 696 F.2d
1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 1983).
54. Justice Rehnquist stated: "We decline to overrule these cases. Sorrells is a precedent of long standing that has already been once reexamined in Sherman and implicitly
there reaffirmed•••• [T]he defense is not of a constitutional dimension. . . ." 411 U.S.
at 433.
55. For a complete discussion of these two minority views, see supra notes 30-35 &
42-48 and accompanying text. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist observed that "equally cogent
criticism has been made of the concurring views in these cases." 411 U.S. at 434.
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notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements for a
proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the
Government. iis
There were two dissents in Russell. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, rigidly adhered to the earlier views of Justices Roberts
and Frankfurter,ii1 noting that "[f]ederal agents play a debased role
when they become the instigators of the crime, or partners in its commission, or the creative brain behind the illegal scheme."iis Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, added a separate
dissenting opinion,119 Rejecting an emphasis on predisposition as misleading,60 Justice Stewart concluded that the "purpose of the entrapment defense ... cannot be to protect persons who are 'otherwise innocent.' Rather, it must be to prohibit unlawful governmental activity
in instigating crime.'' 61 In sum, Justice Stewart reasoned that
when the agents' involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the mere offering of such an opportunity, and when their
56. 411 U.S. at 435. The majority noted that circumstances may exist where the government's use of deceit is the only practicable law enforcement technique available and
stressed that it is only when this deception actually implants the criminal design into the
defendant's mind that the entrapment defense comes into play. Id. at 436.
57. Id. at 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 439. Justice Douglas reiterated Justice Roberts' position that the "prostitution of the criminal law" was the evil at which the defense of entrapment is aimed. Id.
(quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring)).
59. 411 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 442. Justice Stewart argued:
The very fact that he has committed an act that Congress has determined to be
illegal demonstrates conclusively that he is not innocent of the offense. He may
not have originated the precise plan or the precise details, but he was "predisposed" in the sense that he has proved to be quite capable of committing the
crime. That he was induced, provoked, or tempted to do so by government
agents does not make him any more innocent or any less predisposed than he
would be if he had been induced, provoked, or tempted by a private person-which, of course, would not entitle him to cry "entrapment."
Id.
Justice Stewart found a fundamental flaw with the majority's emphasis on predisposition. Such a focus, he argued,
has the direct effect of making what is permissible or impermissible police conduct depend upon the past record and propensities of the particular defendant
involved. Stated another way, this subjective test means that the Government is
permitted to entrap a person with a criminal record or bad reputation, and then
to prosecute him for the manufactured crime, confident that his record or reputation itself will be enough to show that he was predisposed to commit the offense anyway.
Id. at 443-44.
61. Id. at 442.
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conduct is of a kind that could induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to commit it,
then-regardless of the character or propensities of the particular person induced-I think entrapment has occurred. For in
that situation, the Government has engaged in the impermissible manufacturing of crime, and the federal courts should bar
the prosecution in order to preserve the institutional integrity
of the system of federal criminal justice.62
With the decision in Russell, the objective theory of entrapment
was again laid to rest, albeit by the slimmest majority. Three years
later, in Hampton v. United States, 63 the majority would once again
reaffirm its long standing position in what now appears to be the last
word on the subject.64
Hampton had been convicted of two counts of distributing heroin
in violation of federal narcotics law.65 At trial, Hampton contended
that the drugs he sold (he denied knowledge that he was actually dealing in heroin) had all been supplied by one who ultimately proved to
be a government informant. His requested entrapment instruction,
however, was rejected by the district court.66 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Hampton urged that the due process dictum in Russell67 supported the overturning of his conviction.68 In particular, he argued that
the government agents, in s·upplying him with the drugs he had been
convicted of selling, had engaged in conduct "so outrageous that due
62. Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).
63. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
64. Hampton, too, was resolved by a sharply divided Court, with the subjective approach of the Russell majority again posited as the controlling standard. A plurality
opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White. Id. at 485. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 491.
65. Id. at 485. Specifically, Hampton violated a provision of the Drug Abuse Prevention Act, 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) (1976).
66. The instruction Hampton sought the district court to charge consisted of the
following:
The defendant asserts that he was the victim of entrapment as to the crime§
charged in the indictment.
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were sales of narcotics
supplied to him by an informer in the employ of or acting on behalf of the government, then you must acquit the defendant because the law as a matter of
policy forbids his conviction in such a case.
425 U.S. at 487-88 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9). The Eighth Circuit affirmed
Hampton's conviction. Hampton v. United States, 507 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425
U.S. 484 (1976).
67. See supra text accompanying note 53.
68. 425 U.S. at 489.
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process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking
judicial processes to obtain a conviction...." 69 In resolutely rejecting
any such argument, Justice Rehnquist noted that "petitioner misapprehended the meaning of the quoted language in Russell. . . ." 70 Indeed, in making a "determined effort to stamp out any vestige of the
objective test for entrapment,''71 the plurality opinion of Justice Rehnquist unequivocally reaffirmed the predisposition focus of Russell and
its ruling out of "the possibility that the defense of entrapment could
ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this
one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime
was established."72 Reiterating. the "unavailablity of the entrapment
defense to a predisposed defendant under any circumstances,"73 the
opinion clarified the due process reference in Russell:
The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defendant.
Here, as we have noted, the police, the Government informant,
and the defendant acted in concert with one another.... If
the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant
beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing
the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police
under the applicable provisions of state or federal law.74
The concurring justices agreed both with the affirmance of the
conviction and the premise that the entrapment defense should remain
unavailable to a predisposed defendant. 711 They remained unconvinced,
however, that "the concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the
guarantee of due process would never prevent the conviction of a
predisposed defendant, regardless of the outrageousness of police behavior in light of the surrounding circumstances."76 Acknowledging
that "the cases, if any, in which proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be rare,''77 Justice Powell nonetheless was "unwilling to conclude that an analysis other than one limited to predisposition would
never be appropriate under due process principles.m6
Id. (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32).
425 U.S. at 489.
Murchison, supra note 17, at 602.
425 U.S. at 489.
Cronin, The Law of Entrapment in Massachusetts and the First Circuit, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1203, 1211-12 (1980).
74. 425 U.S. at 490.
75. Id. at 494-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 492.
77. Id. at 495 n.7.
78. Id. at 493 (footnote omitted). Justice Powell cited with approval the opinion of
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Justice Brennan, in dissent, echoed the earlier views of Justices
Roberts, Frankfurter, and Stewart,79 and again urged adoption of an
objective theory of entrapment.80 Arguing that the government in this
case was "doing nothing less than buying contraband from itself
through an intermediary and [then] jailing the intermediary,"81 Justice
Brennan concluded that the "Government's role has passed the point
of toleration."82
As a result of a full half century of Supreme Court pronouncements, the substantive parameters of the entrapment defense wotild
seem to be securely fixed. Despite disagreement from some of its members, a majority of the Court appears unswerving in its adherence to a
subjective approach to the doctrine.83 Though the decision in Hampton
represents the prevailing view thus far, the issue can hardly be said to
have been put to rest for all eternity. Indeed, since the decision in
Hampton, a host of new cases replete with variant theories have been
decided. 84 While none have yet been granted Supreme Court review, it
is not unreasonable to believe that there does somewhere loom a case
to serve as the predicate for a renewed Supreme Court treatment.
Judge Friendly in United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973):
[T]here is certainly a [constitutional] limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit government
agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict
other members of a gang of hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involving
participation in activities that result in injury to the rights of its citizens is a
course that courts should be extremely reluctant to sanction.
425 U.S. at 493 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 486 F.2d at 676-77 (footnote omitted)). Arguably, Judge Friendly's example would be of the type even the majority would
endorse as deserving due process protection.
79. 425 U.S. at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 30-35, 42-48 & 59-62
and accompanying text.
80. 425 U.S. at 495-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 498.
82. Id.
There is little, if any, law enforcement interest promoted by such conduct;
plainly it is not designed to discover ongoing drug traffic. Rather, such conduct
deliberately entices an individual to commit a crinle. That the accused is
"predisposed" cannot possibly justify the -action of government officials in purposefully creating the crime. No one would suggest that the police could round
up and jail all "predisposed" individuals, yet that is precisely what set-ups like
the instant one are intended to accomplish.

Id.
83. While one may legitimately speculate as to the continued vitality of this approach
in light of Justice O'Connor's appointment to the Court, such speculation may prove
merely academic since Justice Stewart, her predecessor, had consistently dissented from ·
the majority position on entrapment. Indeed, Justice O'Cmmor's appointment may· well
serve to enhance the unity among the justices rather than factionalize the Court's
approach.
· •
84. See supra note 53.
·.
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Equally likely, however, is the possibility that the next entrapment issue to reach the high Court will concern not the substantive make-up
of the doctrine, but rather a peripheral procedural issue which has yet
to be addressed. Indeed, such a likelihood is enhanced by the divisive
split among the circuits with respect to one such issue, that of the inconsistent entrapment defense, the subject of the remainder of this
note.
II.

THE THEORY OF INCONSISTENT DEFENSES

A. Civil Actions

There is in the folklore of the common law the famous Case of
the Kettle. The plaintiff claimed damages for a kettle which
he asserted the defendant had borrowed and had allowed to
become cracked while it was in his possession. The defendant
is supposed to have pleaded (1) that he did not borrow the
kettle, (2) that it was never cracked and (3) that it was cracked when he borrowed it. 5 G
Despite its folkloric origins, the "Case of the Kettle" has nonetheless managed to work its way into our procedural jurisprudence. In
Rudd v. Dewey,86 the Supreme Court of Iowa commented:
Absurd as it may seem at first blush to allow defendant,
charged with having negligently broken a borrowed kettle, to
answer that he never borrowed the kettle, that it was broken
when he borrowed it, and that it was sound when returned,
nevertheless, when it is reflected that the controversy may be
about a kettle borrowed by defendant's servant, as to which
defendant had no knowledge whatever, and that, the servant
having disappeared, defendant will be entirely dependent on
such casual evidence as he may be able to scrape up in the
neighborhood, the rule is not by any means unreasonable or
without support in public policy. The defendant may not know
what set of facts he will be able to establish . . . and he ought
not to be defeated if on the trial any legitimate defense which
he has pleaded is established by the evidence.87
85. R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 21-22 (3d ed. 1973).
"[T]hese Pleas were held on Demurrer to be pleadable together••••" C.A. KEmwIN,
PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING AT COMMON LAW 270 (1910) quoted in J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY,
HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAw PLEADING 478 n.56 (1969).
86. 121 Iowa 454, 96 N.W. 973 (1903).
87. Id. at 458-59, 96 N.W. at 975 (citations omitted). Interestingly enough, Rudd involved more than a simple question of a bailment; rather, the case was an action for
alienation of affections of plaintiff's wife where the defendant both absolutely denied
having had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff's wife and testified as to a proposition

1984)

NOTE

1039

It should be noted that the Rudd decision marked somewhat of a
departure from the strict forms of common law pleading whose
"avowed object [was] to reduce the controversy of the parties to a Single Material Issue decisive of the case. If a defendant had Several Defenses, the Common Law required him to make his Election between
them and rest his case on the one selected."88 Where a defendant had
available to him more than one defense, he was required to rely on the
one he deemed best. But,
as a mistake in that selection might occasion the loss of the
cause, contrary to the real merits of the case, this restriction
against the use of Several Pleas to the same matter, after being
for ages observed in its original severity, was at length considered as contrary to the true principles of justice.89
In modern civil jurisprudence, the notion of the ancient common
law proscription against inconsistent pleadings has been wholly abandoned. Indeed, under contemporary rules of civil procedure it is "authoritatively accepted ... [that t]he pleader may allege matters alternatively or hypothetically, and except for ... good faith requirements
. . . , the allegations may even be inconsistent. The pleader cannot be
required to elect among his allegations but is entitled to have all his
claims and defenses considered by the trier of facts." 90 Professors
Wright and Miller offer compelling justification for this enlightened
view:
Common law and code practice condemned inconsistency
in pleading because it was believed that a pleading containing
made by the husband, which, if true, would have justified the defendant in believing that
his sexual relations would not have been objectionable to the husband. Id. at 455-56, 96
N.W. at 973-74. Ultimately, the court reversed the decision of the trial court for having
erroneously instructed on the issue of inconsistent defenses. Id. at 459-60, 96 N.W. at
975.
88. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 475 (1969).
89. Id. at 477. Accordingly, "the defendant may Plead as many different matters as
he shall think necessary for his Defence, though they may appear to be contradictory or
inconsistent . . . ." Id. at 478 (quoting W. TIDD, PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S
BENCH IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, c. XXXVIII, OF PLEAS IN BAR AND NOTICE OF SET-OFF, 610
(1st Am. ed., Philadelphia, 1807)).
90. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 321-22 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2): "A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically. . . . A party may also state as many separate
claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency. . . ." Id. Professors Wright and
Miller have noted: "The draftsmen of Rule 8(e)(2) sought to free federal procedure from
• . • insistence on certainty in the pleadings. They realized that flexible pleading was
essential to a full presentation of all relevant facts and legal theories at trial and the final
settlement of disputes on their merits." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1282, at 368 (1969).
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inconsistent allegations indicated falsehood on its face and was
a sign of a chicanerous litigant seeking to subvert the judicial
process. All too frequently, however, valid claims were sacrificed on the altars of technical consistency. . . . In contrast to
common law and code practice, the rules recognize that inconsistency in pleadings does not necessarily mean dishonesty, and
that frequently a party, in good faith, must assert contradictory statements when he legitimately is in doubt about the factual background of his case or the legal bases for his recovery
or defense. 91
Moreover, "if the facts he asserted in the pleadings were not confirmed
by later proof, his action would fail even if his proof demonstrated a
right to relief on some other theory." 92
Though lacking any immediate intuitive appeal, the propriety of
inconsistent pleadings does begin to assume some legitimacy upon further reflection. While our initial reaction to any logical inconsistency is
understandably one of disapproval, further examination enables us to
comprehend the part non sequiturs do play in the search for truth.
Indeed, in an exaggerated sense, pleadings themselves are meaningless;
only the evidence adduced at trial will serve to secure truth and presumably justice. Accordingly, our concerns should be less with the
means to be employed than with the ends we seek. When viewed in
this light, it becomes manifest that the small sacrifice of logical perfection secures for us the greater good of ultimate truth.
While few would deny the appropriateness of inconsistent pleadings in our civil system, the same cannot be said with respect to their
place in the criminal law. As will be argued below,93 even stronger justifications may warrant their applicability there.

B. Criminal Actions
Despite the longstanding availability of inconsistent defenses in
civil actions,9 ' our criminal jurisprudence has yet to develop a similarly
well-settled philosophy. While at least one commentator has suggested
that inconsistent defenses in the criminal context "seem to be a generally accepted principle in American jurisprudence,"9 G there does not
exist anywhere near the unanimity of opinion found in the civil con91. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 90, § 1283, at 372-73 (footnotes omitted).
92. Id. § 1282, at 368 (footnote omitted).
93. See infra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
95. Nagle, Inconsistent Defenses in Criminal Cases, 92 Mn.. L. REV. 77, 79 (1981)
(citing 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 141 (1965); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 54 (1961)).
See also United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
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text. 98 Indeed, even among those jurisdictions which ostensibly permit
inconsistent defenses, there remains confusion as to in which circumstances and to what extent the defenses may be asserted. 97 Nonetheless, an evaluation of those decisions permitting such defenses reveals
abundant support for the general proposition that inconsistent defenses are properly to be accorded a criminal defendant.
Initially, it would be useful to examine the opinions that restrict
the use of inconsistent defenses so as to evaluate their reasoning as
compared to the more permissive jurisdictions. As will be discussed
more thoroughly below,98 however, quests to unearth the substantive
reasoning underlying these decisions will often prove disappointing.
Rarely are more than the barest conclusory statements to be found in
attempts to justify the rule. 99 We turn then to a representative sam96. Nagle notes that such defenses have "specifically been permitted to some extent
in seven federal circuits, 26 states, and the military. • • ." Nagle, supra note 95, at 79
(footnotes omitted). Nearly every case cited in arriving at these numbers, however, is
followed by an indication of contrary authority within the same jurisdiction. See id. at
nn. 9 & 10.
To some degree, the lack of uniformity is perhaps attributable to the absence of any
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure analogue to Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, set forth supra in note 90. One court has noted that "no such provision
would be appropriate in view of the fact that all possible defenses not raised by appropriate motion are embraced within the plea of not guilty." Henderson v. United States,
237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1956) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(a)). For a discussion of
Henderson, see infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
97. For example, a number of courts permit inconsistent defenses only to the extent
they are found to be not too inconsistent; that is, where proof of one defense does not
necessarily disprove the other. See, e.g., United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182-83
(5th Cir. 1977), discussed infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text; Henderson v.
United States, 237 F.2d 169, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1956), discussed infra notes 178-88; cf.
State v. Burns, 15 Or. App. 552, 516 P.2d 748 (1973) ("mutually exclusive defenses").
Other courts speak in terms of permitting "alternative defenses." See, e.g., Hansford v.
United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane), discussed infra notes 233-36
and accompanying text; State v. Lora, 305 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1957) (alibi and insanity).
Still other courts suggest the possibility of inconsistent defenses which historically have
not been viewed as "so repugnant as to be impermissible. Two prime examples of this
have been accident and self-defense, and denial and self-defense." Nagle, supra note 95,
at 82 (footnotes omitted).
98. See infra notes 140-45.
99. See, e.g., State v. Vitale, 23 Ariz. App. 37, 530 P.2d 394 (1975). Vitale had been
charged with attempting to receive stolen property, and claimed both that he did not
know the items were stolen and that he had been entrapped. The court observed that
denial of the requisite knowledge, and therefore denial of the criminal intent and ultimate guilt, was wholly inconsistent with an entrapment defense. In disallowing the dual
defenses, the court reasoned: "It would appear that the appellant is semantically going in
circles..• •"Id. at 43, 530 P.2d at 400. No further discussion was offered. See also State
v. Kinchen, 126 La. 39, 47, 52 So. 185, 188 (1910) ("We agree with the view that a defendant cannot be allowed to occupy the inconsistent position • • • of denying the procurement, and at the same time contending that he repented and countermanded it.").
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piing of those courts which recognize the propriety of inconsistent
defenses.
While not unique in its holding or rationale, the Maryland case of
Bartram v. State 100 provides an interesting judicial perspective on this
entire controversy. Marilyn Bartram had been convicted of the second
degree murder of her husband. 101 Despite her defense that her husband's death was the result of suicide, Mrs. Bartram maintained on
appeal that the trial judge had improperly instructed on the burden of
proof with respect to the mitigating factor of provocation. In sum, she
both denied commission of the crime and simultaneously sought to excuse it. 10z Noting that Mrs. Bartram was "a woman rent by internal
tension at least during the five years of her married life,"103 the court
thought ironic
the masterfully thorough defense urged on behalf of appellant
. . . also rent by internal tension. It consisted of an imaginative and meticulously prepared defense upon the merits; it also
consists, at the present level, of four claims of constitutional
error. The strategically compelled defense of suicide, on the
one hand, tugged compellingly in one direction. . . . The
thrust of three of the four constitutional contentions, on the
other hand, is in a diametrically opposite direction. 104
Thus prompted, the court's frustration, doubtless representative of
scores of judges faced with similar arguments, took for its expression
the following: "One wants to say to the defense, 'Shorn of technicality,
what do you really want? Which way would you have it? . . . Either
position is legitimate, but choose. It ill behooves you to try to have it
both ways.' moi1
Still, the court acknowledged: "To be sure, contradictory defenses
are not impermissible in our jurisprudence,"106 and then artfully added
in embellishment: "The net effect nonetheless is to reduce the constiAdmittedly, many of those jurisdictions permitting inconsistent defenses are equally
lacking in substantive discourse and simply state their conclusion that such defenses are
permissible. This seems less objectionable, however, since non-interference, i.e., permissiveness, arguably requires less justification than affirmative attempts to curtail or restrict a defendant's procedural options.
100. 33 Md. App. 115, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976), aff'd, 280 Md. 616, 374 A.2d 1144 (1977).
101. Id. at 117, 364 A.2d at 1122.
102. In a realistic sense, this is perhaps the clearest case in which antithetical defenses should be acceptable. Mrs. Bartram, acutely aware of the strong likelihood that a
jury would fail to credit her story of suicide, did whatever she could in an attempt to
mitigate her guilt and thereby the punishment that would flow from the jury's findings.
103. 33 Md. App. at 117, 364 A.2d at 1122.
104. Id., 364 A.2d at 1122.
105. Id. at 118, 364 A.2d at 1122.
106. Id., 364 A.2d at 1123.
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tutional arguments to the clever legalism of the debating chamber and
to mute the anguished cry of outraged innocence."107
A more substantially reasoned opinion was provided by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Mitcheson. 108 Mitcheson had been
convicted of second degree murder. His appeal charged as error the
refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on the proffered defense of
"using force in the protection of one's habitation.mo9 Presumably, the
trial court refused the instruction because it was inconsistent with
Mitcheson's more general defense that the shooting was an accident. In
holding that a defendant was entitled to assert inconsistent defenses,110
the court wrote:

In a criminal case the defendant need not specially plead
his defenses. The entry of a plea of not guilty places upon the
State the burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This gives the defendant the benefit
of every defense thereto which may cause a reasonable doubt
to exist as to his guilt, arising either from the evidence, or lack
of evidence, in the case; and this is true whether his defenses
are consistent or not. 111
The justification for permitting inconsistent defenses is further suggested by the court's conclusion that "if the requested instruction had
been given and the jury had considered the evidence, there [was] a
reasonable likelihood that it may have had some effect upon the verdict rendered. " 112 This of course cuts right to the heart of the importance of allowing contradictory defenses-preserving for the jury the
right to decide all the facts of a particular case and thereby do justice
to both the prosecution and the defendant. 113
Similar reasoning was employed by the Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v. Hansma. 114 There, the defendant had been convicted
of first degree murder after unsuccessfully attempting to argue in defense both an alibi and intoxication as a mitigating circumstance.115
107. Id., 364 A.2d at 1123. Mrs. Bartram's conviction and five year sentence were
upheld on appeal. Bartram v. State, 280 Md. 616, 374 A.2d 1144 (1977).
108. 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977).
109. Id. at 1121.
110. Prior to this holding, the court concluded that in this case the defense of selfdefense was not necessarily inconsistent with the defense of accident. Id. at 1122.
111. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
112. Id.
113. This notion is explored in greater detail infra at notes 276-87 and accompanying
text.
114. 84 Mich. App. 138, 269 N.W.2d 504 (1978).
115. Id. at 144-45, 269 N.W.2d at 506-07. The trial judge, in refusing to instruct the
jury on the issue of intoxication, remarked:
I didn't give the intoxication [instruction] because though there was a claim that
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Holding preclusion of inconsistent defenses to be error,116 the court's
focus turned on making available to a defendant all defenses for which
evidence was available. More specifically, to the extent evidence existed to support a requested charge to the jury, it would be error to
deny the request. 117
A parallel, though more detailed, exposition of this analysis, was
offered by the California District Court of Appeal in People v. Keel. 118
In permitting a defendant to simultaneously deny having committed a
murder and urge a theory of self-defense, the court emphasized the
importance of permitting the jury to evaluate all the evidence. 119 Quoting its earlier opinion in People v. Degnan, 220 the court observed:
The burden is upon the people to prove [all] elements, of
course, and it is inconceivable that the defendant may not offer
proof to rebut the evidence introduced by the prosecution in
support of each of the . . . branches of the case. In civil actions
the defendant-the defendant testified and Tim Green testified that they had
both been doing considerable drinking, smoking pot. I don't know if anybody
was using cocaine but most everything else. And so then the defendant takes the
witness stand and testifies in detail everything [that] he did that night, where he
was, what he did, what time it was, whether he was watching television, sitting
at the dining room table, and I just don't see how somebody can say now here is
what I did all that evening and therefore I've got an alibi, but if you don't
believe my alibi, then I was totally intoxicated to do it. [It j]ust doesn't ring
true to me and I refuse to give the intoxication [instruction].
Id. at 144-45 n.1, 269 N.W.2d at 507 n.1 (emphasis by the appellate court).
116. Id. at 145, 269 N.W.2d at 507. Ultimately, the error was held to be harmless
since the intoxication defense was unavailable in the non-specific intent crime of manslaughter. Id. at 148, 269 N.W.2d at 509.
117. Id. at 147, 269 N.W.2d at 508-09. See also Womack v. United States, 336 F.2d
959 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("a defendant is entitled to an instruction on any issue fairly raised
by the evidence, whether or not consistent with the defendant's testimony or the defense
trial theory"); Love v. State, 16 Ala. App. 44, 45, 75 So. 189, 190 (1917) ("While the
excluded evidence is offered on a theory inconsistent with the defendant's alibi, it is not
inconsistent with the theory of the state, and has some tendency to rebut the state's
testimony tending to prove one of the essential elements of the statutory offense.").
118. 91 Cal. App. 599, 267 P. 161 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
119. Id. at 602, 267 P. at 163. The court accorded great weight to the Attorney General's submission of 13 RULING CASE LAW 813 (1916), which advised:
Whether it is the duty of the court in a prosecution for homicide to instruct
the jury on the question of self-defense when defendant denies the killing seems
to depend entirely upon the nature of the evidence introduced at the trial. • • •
[l]f the evidence tends to raise the issue of self-defense although the defendant
denies the killing, it seems that an instruction based on the theory of self-defense is proper and should be given. His denial of the act does not necessarily
warrant the trial court in refusing to give an instruction based on the theory of
self-defense.
91 Cal. App. at 602, 267 P. at 163 (quoting 13 RULING CASE LAW 813 (1916)).
120. 70 Cal. App. 567, 234 P. 129 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925).
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it is the well-established rule, expressed; in fact, in the statute
• . . that a defendant "may set forth by answer as many defenses . . . as he may have"; and it is well settled that the
terms of the section permit the allegation of inconsistent defenses. . . . These, of course, are rules of pleading, but a similar rule, as a matter of evidence and independent of statute,
would seem necessarily to apply in criminal cases under the
issue presented by a plea of not guilty. 121
The insights to be gleaned from this small sampling of permissive
jurisdictions speak favorably to the ultimate superiority of allowing inconsistent defenses. Despite the presence of purely formal logical infirmities, the assertion of such defenses preserves for defendants the ability to present their full case to the factfinding body. It thus also
ensures that factfinding will not be artificially limited, but instead, permitted to cover the broad range of issues certain to emerge in the criminal trial.
ill.

INCONSISTENCY AND THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

Despite the relatively settled nature of what constitutes entrapment,122 widespread disagreement continues among the circuits123 as to
the availability of the entrapment defense when its assertion is deemed
to be inconsistent with an accused's other defenses. To the extent this
procedural sub-issue will often determine the availability of the defense itself, a critical understanding of the various views and the arguments informing each position is essential. Our inquiry will first address those jurisdictions which reject out-of-hand the use of
inconsistent defenses ("restrictive jurisdictions").m This will be followed by an analysis of those jurisdictions which embrace a more moderate position and accept the defense in certain circumstances ("quasirestrictive jurisdictions").1211 Finally, we will explore the decisions of
121. 91 Cal. App. at 602, 267 P. at 163 (quoting 70 Cal. App. at 591, 234 P. at 139)
(citations omitted).
122. See, e.g., supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1170 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The
other circuits are both literally and figuratively spread all over the map on this question."); United States v. Bishop, 367 F.2d 806, 809 n.4 (2d Cir. 1966) ("A difference of
opinion exists among the various circuits on this question."); Murchison, supra note 17,
at 610-12; Orfield, supra note 17, at 65-66 ("The current status of federal law on entrapment may be approximately characterized as confused."}; Comment, The Assertion of
Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases, 56 lowA L. REV. 686, 686-87 n.6 (1971).
124. Infra notes 127-76 and accompanying text.
125. Infra notes 177-230 and accompanying text.
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those courts which entirely approve of the assertion of an inconsistent
entrapment defense ("permissive jurisdictions").126
A. Restrictive Jurisdictions
Generally stated, the inconsistency rule precludes an accused from
raising the defense of entrapment unless he admits127 to the crime
charged. That is, the inherent inconsistency between a denial of guilt
and the assertion of entrapment, precludes their contemporaneous
use. 128 The rule is said to have found its origins129 in People v. Mum, 180
decided in 1922 by the Supreme Court of Michigan. The defendant,
who had been charged with selling liquor illegally, claimed that his
wife had made the sale, but that if he had made it, then he had been
126. Infra notes 232-46 and accompanying text.
127. "Admits" may prove to be an overgeneralization since some courts frame the
rule in different terms. For example, while the Third and Seventh Circuits hold a defendant's admission of guilt to be a prerequisite to raising the entrapment defense, see, e.g.,
United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnston, 426
F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1970), the First, Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits require only
that the defendant not deny his guilt in order to be entitled to the defense. See, e.g.,
United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Annese,
631F.2d1041, 1046-47 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Worth, 505 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602, 605
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971). But see United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d
1308, 1314 (5th Cir.) ("to assert the defense of entrapment, the defendant must admit he
committed the acts on which the prosecution is predicated"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118
(1982); United States v. Gibson, 446 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir. 1971) ("an accused cannot
raise the defense of entrapment unless he admits to the commission of the crime
charged"). In those jurisdictions requiring the defendant to admit his guilt, it is still not
clear precisely what will suffice to constitute an admission. See, e.g., United States v.
Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 958, 964 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112,
114 (7th Cir. 1970); Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1967); cf.
United States v. Hendricks, 456 F.2d 167, 169 (9th Cir. 1972) (defense counsel's opening
and closing arguments not sufficient to establish admission).
128. The precise rule has been variously stated. See, e.g., United States v. Nicoll, 664
F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th Cir.) ("to assert the defense of entrapment, the defendant must
admit he committed the acts on which the prosecution is predicated"), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1118 (1982); United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1980) ("a defendant may not simultaneously plead entrapment and deny committing the acts on which
the prosecution is predicated"); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979)
("defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the defense of entrapment unless he
admits that there were present the elements of the crime with which he is charged");
United States v. Caron, 588 F.2d 851, 852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978) ("the issue of entrapment
does not arise until a defendant admits commission of the crime charged"); United
States v. Gibson, 446 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir. 1971) ("an accused cannot raise the defense of entrapment unless he admits to the commission of the crime charged"); United
States v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1970) ("absent admission of the act an
instruction on entrapment will not be submitted to the jury").
129. Groot, supra note 31, at 260.
130. 220 Mich. 555, 190 N.W. 666 (1922).
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entrapped. 131 Citing no authority, the court held that the "[d]efendant
is in no position to urge that the act complained of was induced by
entrapment, . . . for he claims he made no sale. . . ." 132 The lack of
precedent upon which to ground its decision did not seem to trouble
the Michigan court, nor did the paucity of support seem to inhibit
other courts who were early to reach the issue. 133 Indeed, in terms of
judicial precedent, most of the modern day decisions appear to rest
precariously upon little more than an ill-supported house of cards. One
of the most frequently cited authorities in support of the inconsistency
rule is the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Eastman v. United
States. 134 The defendants in Eastman had been convicted of having
131. Id. at 558, 190 N.W. at 666.
132. Id. The rule first appeared in the federal courts in Nutter v. United States, 289
F. 484 (4th Cir. 1923), in which a defendant who denied having sold morphine simultaneously urged that he had been entrapped. Id. at 485. The court wrote:
The defendant denies that any sale whatever was made, or that any drugs
passed. Neverthess his learned counsel claims here, as he did below, that the
conviction should be set aside, because, as is alleged, the defendant was tempted
or entrapped into doing what the jury found that he did. Such contention ignores, not only his own testimony that all of Williams' story was false, but the
evidence of Williams that he had bought drugs from the defendant a hundred
times before.
Id. at 485.
Ironically, while the Fourth Circuit was the first federal court to articulate a prohibition of inconsistent defenses, its own position was rather short-lived. See Crisp v. United
States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958). In Crisp, the defendant testified that he had not
made an illegal sale of prescription drugs, but rather that government agents had snatched the bottle of pills from his hand. Id. at 70. The court held that such testimony did not
preclude an instruction to the jury on the issue of entrapment: "We think it perfectly
proper to allow a criminal defendant to submit to a jury alternative defenses." Id.
133. See Groot, supra note 31, at 260 n.30.
134. 212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954). Significantly, Eastman and its progeny were expressly overruled by the Ninth Circuit sitting en bane in United States v. Demma, 523
F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane), discussed infra notes 154-76 and accompanying
text. Yet, ironically, and in perpetuation of the precedentially unfounded inconsistency
rule, these cases continue to be cited authoritatively outside the Ninth Circuit. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Nicosia, 638 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), rejected the use of an inconsistent entrapment defense,
relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Rovario, 379 F.2d 911, 914 (7th Cir.
1967), whose foundation can ultimately be traced back to Eastman. The faulty reliance
on Rovario by the Nicosia court was clearly exposed in the dissent of Circuit Judge
Swygert, 638 F.2d at 977-78 (Swygert, J., dissenting). In addition to observing that
Rovario had stated the inconsistency rule in "cryptic terms,'' id. at 977, he noted:
It is significant that this court in Rovario cited for its sole support Ortega v.
United States, 348 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1965). The significance lies in the fact that
the Ortega decision, which followed an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Eastman v.
United States, 212 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1954), was disapproved by the Demma en
bane court.
638 F.2d at 978. See also United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977). The Hart court stated:
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unlawfully imported, concealed, and facilitated the transportation of a
large quantity of opium. 1311 On appeal, the defendants argued that the
trial court had erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue of
entrapment. In affirming the convictions, the Ninth Circuit held:
Appellants, to say the least, take a very inconsistent position in
this respect. Appellants have maintained throughout that they
did not commit a crime. It logically follows that absent the
commission of a crime there can be no entrapment. The trial
court understood this situation and very properly refused to
inject into the case a question which could have no other result
than to confuse.136
It is critical to note, however, that the authority cited by the Eastman court in support of the inconsistency rule, Bakotich v. United
States, 137 was arguably misapplied. While the Bakotich defendant both
denied having committed the offense and sought an instruction on entrapment, the court's holding foreclosed an entrapment defense solely
because of a lack of evidence.138 Indeed, no mention whatever was
made of the issue of inconsistency. 139
Thus, notwithstanding any more substantive infirmities,1'' 0 it apIn requiring [the defendant] to admit the offense as a condition to his asserting
entrapment, the district court relied on the Eastman line of cases that we overruled in United States v. Demma. . . . Demma mended a break in the law
caused by the aberrational Eastman cases and its spawn and reconciled the law
of our Circuit with [Sorrells, Sherman and Russell].
Id. at 803.
The First Circuit also relies on decisions based on Eastman in prohibiting the use of
an inconsistent entrapment defense. See, e.g., United States v. Caron, 588 F.2d 851, 852
n.4 (lat Cir. 1978) (citing Sylvia v. United States, 312 F.2d 145 (lat Cir.), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 809 (1963)).
Eastman sinillarly endures in the Third Circuit. For example, in United States v.
Levin, 606 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1979), the court cited United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504
(3d Cir. 1973) for the proposition that a defendant cannot avail himself of the entrapment defense unless he admits that he committed the acts with which he is charged. 606
F.2d at 48. Watson cites United States v. Hendricks, 456 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1972) for the
same proposition, 489 F.2d at 507, and Hendricks in turn relies on Eastman, 456 F.2d at
169.
The situation in the aforementioned circuits calls to mind the admonition of Goethe
that "[w]hen an erroneous hypothesis becomes entrenched and generally accepted, it is
transformed into a kind of a tenet that no one is allowed to question and investigate; and
then it becomes an evil which endures for centuries." J.W. VON GOETHE, 13 GoETHES
WERKE: ZUR NATUR WISSENSCHAFT IM ALLGEMEINEN 51 (E. Trunz ed. 1955).
135. 212 F.2d at 321.
136. Id. at 322 (citation omitted).
137. 4 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1925).
138. Id. at 387.
139. See Groot, supra note 31, at 260 n.31.
140. See infra notes 249-88 and accompanying text.
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pears that the inconsistency rule remains questionable even in its origins. That scores of later decisions have grasped hold of Eastman for
support is unfortunate and may lead one to seriously question their
ultimate validity. Indeed, one may question the validity of these decisions in more general terms; even the most objective observer would be
hard-pressed to find much, if any, analytical support among any of the
decisions which cling steadfastly to the inconsistency rule. While language descriptive of the rule is certainly not lacking, m cogent argumentation proffered on its behalf, where not simply ipse dixit, often
takes the form of the following: "The rationale for the rule is based on
the inherent inconsistency of saying at the same time, 'I didn't do it,'
and 'the government tricked or seduced me into doing it' " 142 or, "Such
a defense 'admits all elements of the offense,' and appellants' reliance
on it would be 'unusual ... in that he [would claim] he was entrapped
into violating a law that he also [would claim] he did not violate in the
first place.' "m A somewhat more reasoned explanation of the rule suggests: "Since a defendant maintains this defense by asserting that the
criminal action was not contemplated by him until he was induced to
cominit it by a government agent, the defendant must admit that he
committed the act which constituted the crime. " 144 While none would
find fault with the logical conclusions thus reached-entrapment and
denial are indeed logically inconsistent-such naive analyses are readily discredited as conclusory. Inconsistency is therefore not an objec141. See supra note 128.
142. United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1980). In fairness, it should
be noted that the court recognized that "[t]he continued cogency of this position has
been debated, ••• but as a panel we are bound by the law of the circuit." Id. Indeed,
the court noted that there was " 'a veritable legion of opinion in this Circuit' that a
defendant may not simultaneously plead entrapment and deny committing the acts on
which the prosecution is predicated...•" Id. (quoting United States v. Greenfield, 544
F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978)). It would appear, though,
that the court had but added one more ring to the ever widening circumference of concentric circles in which it was already hopelessly enveloped; the "legion of opinion" upon
which it relied had also described the rationale of the rule as "appear[ing] to be that to
deny the very acts upon which the prosecution is predicated and at the same time to
plead the defense of entrapment, which assumes that the acts charged were committed,
is too inconsistent." United States v. Greenfield, 544 F.2d at 182. See also United States
v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535, 542 (5th Cir. 1978) ("too inconsistent and confusing") (emphasis added).
143. United States v. Mitchell, 514 F.2d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting United
States v. Lamonge, 458 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972));
United States v. Posey, 501 F.2d 998, 1002 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847
(1975).
144. Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir.) (footnote omitted), rev'd on
other grounds, 389 U.S. 45 (1967).
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tionable reason for the rule but rather a situation suitably dealt with
at trial. 145
Despite the weakest of foundations, the inconsistency rule is well
established in at least five circuits; the First,148 Third,m Seventh148
145. See infra notes 276-88 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Caron, 588 F.2d 851, 852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978); Sylvia v.
United States, 312 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1963). But cf. United States v. Annese, 631
F.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1st Cir. 1980) (inconsistency rule not applicable where defendant
does not take stand to deny crime).
The Caron decision contains an interesting qualification regarding cases where the
defendant had acted merely as a "procuring agent." The court stated that in such
instances
we [find] no inconsistency between trying to convince the jury that the acts alleged did not add up to the crime charged and trying to convince the jury that
one was entrapped into such innocent acts. A defendant can claim that he was
induced by the government to perform acts which were, after all, innocent and
which he contends did not consititute a violation of law of the sort for which he
was indicted.
588 F.2d at 853.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979); Virgin Islands v. Hernandez, 508 F.2d 712, 717 n.5 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Watson, 489
F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1973); cf. United States v. Levin, 606 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam). The Levin court concluded:
[I]t would impair the effectiveness of the adversarial process to permit a criminal defendant to allude to a theory of entrapment, and thus to plant the defense
in the jurors' minds, without putting the government on notice so that it can
meet its burden of proving that the defendant was not entrapped. Therefore, we
hold that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction on entrapment unless he
explicitly pleads, at a sufficiently early point in the trial, that he was entrapped.
Id. at 48-49. But see United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982):
In none of the cited cases, nor in any other case that has come to my attention has the Third Circuit Court of Appeals been squarely presented with the
question of the availability of an entrapment defense to a defendant who, while
admitting the operative facts, disputes mens rea, or challenges a jurisdictional
element. I am reasonably confident that, properly understood, the Third Circuit
cases go no further than to establish that a defendant must admit whatever action he claims to have been entrapped into performing. • . • There is neither
factual nor legal inconsistency when a defendant takes the position, "I do not
agree with the Government's claim that I performed acts A and B. I admit that I
did do act C, but I was entrapped into doing it." If acts A, B and C are all
essential ingredients of the crime charged, the defendant is entitled to acquittal
if there is a reasonable doubt as to any of the essential elements, that is, reasonable doubt as to whether he committed acts A or B, or reasonable doubt as to
whether his performance of act C was the result of entrapment. Any contrary
rule would do violence to fundamental constitutional concepts.
Id. at 1201-02.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Nicosia, 638 F.2d 970, 972-73 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); United States v. Georgiou, 333 F.2d 440 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
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and Tenth149 Circuits appear to have never permitted the assertion of
inconsistent defenses, while the Sixth Circuit has only recently
adopted this position. 1150
The continued allegiance of these circuits to the inconsistency rule
has attracted its share of criticism, both from other courts1151 and from
the commentators. 1152 The most significant assault, and one which
threatens the lowest and most fragile tier of the house of cards,1153 came
in 1975 from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en bane in
United States v. Demma. 1154 The two defendants in Demma had been
convicted of conspiring to import and distribute heroin. m Their appeal
was premised on the failure of the trial judge to instruct on the issue of
entrapment.m In "set[ting] the circuit's entrapment law in order by
holding that a defendant may assert entrapment without being re149. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 446 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir. 1971); Martinez
v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1967). But see United States v. Worth,
505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975), perhaps suggesting a
slight modification of the rule in holding that "testimony from an accused is not a prerequisite to his reliance upon the defense of entrapment." Id. at 1209 (footnote omitted).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 514 F.2d 758, 760-61 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v. Shameia, 464 F.2d 629, 631 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1076 (1972). The earlier view of the Sixth Circuit had been that the "arguable
inconsistence between [the] defenses [did not] rule out submission of both to the jury."
United States v. Baker, 373 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1967); see also Scriber v. United States,
4 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1925).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Nicosia, 638 F.2d 970, 977-79 (7th Cir. 1980) (SWYgert,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981,
982-86 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane); People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 775-76, 401 P.2d 934,
937-38, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 329-30 (1965).
152. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 373-74 n.29 (1972) ("There
is authority for the proposition that the defendant may not use the defense of entrapment if he denies that he engaged in the forbidden conduct. . . . However, it would
seem that he should be allowed to use the defense under the circumstances.") (citations
omitted); Cronin, supra note 73, at 1234-37; Groot, supra note 31; Murchison, supra
note 17, at 610-12; Orfield, supra note 17, at 65-67; Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1333, 1343 (1960); Comment, Criminal Law-Defenses-Defense of Entrapment is
Available in Federal Prosecution Although Inducement was by State Officer and Although Defendant Denies Acts Charged, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1302, 1303-04 (1957); Comment, The Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases, supra note 123.
153. See supra text accompanying note 134.
154. 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
155. Id. at 982.
156. Id. The district court refused the instruction believing that the defense was
available only to a defendant who conceded both the acts and state of mind necessary to
constitute the crime charged. Id. Prior to the en bane Demma decision, this was, of
course, the law in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 178
& n.21 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 801 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974);
United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145, 149 & n.17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974
(1971); Ortiz v. United States, 358 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1966); Ortega v. United States,
348 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1965).
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quired to concede that he committed the crime charged or any of its
elements,"1117 the Demma panel chose to explicitly overrule its earlier
view, noting that "[t]he Eastman rule must be rejected for several reasons."1118 Beginning with an analysis of Sorrells v. United States,1 119 the
court proceeded with the notion that this approach assumed that the
acts necessary to constitute any federal crime must be non-entrapped
acts. 160 That is to say, non-entrapment is taken to be an "essential element of every federal crime which is put in issue whenever evidence is
introduced suggesting that an unpredisposed defendant was induced
by the Government to commit the acts charged."161 It then recognized
Chief Justice Hughes' express rejection in Sorrells of the government's
contention that a claim of entrapment necessarily involved an admission of guilt:
This, as we have seen, is a misconception. The defense is available, not in the view that the accused though guilty may go
free, but that the government cannot be permitted to contend
that he is guilty of a crime where the government officials are
the instigators of his conduct.162
The Eastman rule, the court reasoned, with its requirement that the
defendant concede a state of mind, was therefore "in direct conflict
with the Sorrells conception of entrapment."163
Articulating a second, though less fundamental critique of the
Eastman rule, the court concluded that it could not even be justified
by the inconsistency theory itself, ostensibly the rule's raison d'etre. 184
157. 523 F.2d at 982.
158. Id. "First, in some of its applications, ••• the rule conflicts with prevailing Supreme Court authority. Second, in other of its applications, the rule has become detached from its theoretical moorings and cannot be justified by the inconsistency theory.
Third, the inconsistency theory itself is seriously infirm." Id.
159. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). For a discussion of Sorrells, see supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
160. 523 F.2d at 983.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting 287 U.S. at 452).
163. 523 F.2d at 983. More specifically, the court recognized that:
Under Sorrells, whenever the element of non-entrapment is put in issue the
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts charged were
non-entrapped acts. The Government bears this burden whether or not the
crime charged involves a subjective, mental element and whether or not the defendant concedes any mental element involved. The Eastman rule relieves the
Government of this burden whenever the crime charged involves a mental element which the defendant refuses to concede. Relieving the Government of the
burden of proving that the necessary acts were non-entrapped acts conflicts fundamentally with the Sorrells conception of entrapment.
Id. at 983-84.
164. Id. at 984.
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More specifically, the court reasoned that the inconsistency theory
speaks to those instances in which the defendant actually denies commission of the crime charged. 165 It observed, however, that if a defendant declined to testify at trial, or otherwise refused to comment on
the charge, then he had not denied the crime. 166 Were entrapment then
to be raised at trial,1 67 there would be no inconsistency since the defendant would not have denied the crime. In this situation, the Eastman
rule could not be applied to preclude an entrapment defense not only
because there would be no factual inconsistency, but beca"use its "application . . . would foreclose the possibility of finding entrapment as a
matter of law where a defendant has neither denied nor conceded the
elements constituting the crime charged. . . ." 168
Finally, the court reached what it perceived to be the most fundamental flaw of the Eastman rule: "The theoretical basis of the Eastman rule-that factually inconsistent defenses may not be asserted-is
seriously infirm and deserves rejection for that reason alone."169 Beginning with the well-established premise170 that "a defendant in a criminal prosecution may assert inconsistent defenses,"171 the court noted:
The rule in favor of inconsistent defenses reflects the belief of
modern criminal jurisprudence that a criminal defendant
should be accorded every reasonable protection in defending
himself against governmental prosecution. That established
policy bespeaks a healthy regard for circumscribing the Government's opportunities for invoking the criminal sanction. 172
165. Id. Compare id. with supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
166. 523 F.2d at 984.
167. Despite silence on the part of a defendant, the court suggested two ways in
which entrapment may nonetheless become an issue at trial: "[I]f (1) the Government's
case-in-chief suggests that the defendant who was not predisposed was induced to commit the crime charged, or (2) a defense or a government witness gives evidence suggesting entrapment." 523 F.2d at 984.
168. Id. "Where the Government's own evidence establishes that the defendant was
entrapped, the Government's case must be dismissed, even if the defendant has neither
denied nor conceded the elements constituting the crime charged." Id. (citing Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), discussed supra notes 36-48 and accompanying
text). A similar stance has been taken by a number of quasi-restrictive courts. See infra
notes 178-231 and accompanying text.
169. 523 F.2d at 985.
170. See supra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
171. 523 F.2d at 985 (citing United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 606, 611-12 (5th Cir.
1970)) (denial of conspiracy and claim of entrapment); Johnson v. United States, 426
F.2d 651, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane) (denial of sexual intercourse and claim of consent), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 846 (1971); Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane) (denial of drug transaction and claim of entrapment); Whittaker v. United States, 281 F.2d 631, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (denial of underlying acts and
claim of insanity).
172. 523 F.2d at 985.
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It then censured the Eastman pronouncement as an exception to this
general rule for which justification was lacking,173 noting that "[t]here
is no conceivable reason for permitting a defendant to assert inconsistent defenses in other contexts but denying him that right in the context of entrapment.''174
Despite recognizing that it would be "very unlikely that a defendant would be able to prove entrapment without testifying, and in the
course of testifying, without admitting that he did the acts charged,''1711
the court felt compelled to overrule Eastman and put its house in order, "harmonizing the law of the circuit with the rationale of Sorrells,
Sherman, and Russell and eradicating [its] aberrant cases."176
In large measure, perhaps it has been a dissatisfaction with, and a
recognition of, the irrational limitations of this all-or-nothing approach
which has led a number of jurisdictions to modify their stances on inconsistency and permit, in certain circumstances, its use. It is to these
quasi-restrictive jurisdictions that we now turn.

B. Quasi-Restrictive Jurisdictions
The Fifth Circuit appears to have considered the issue of the inconsistent entrapment defense more frequently than most others. To
some degree, this may be the result of the large number of exceptions
it has sought to engraft upon its generally restrictive view. 177
The first major discussion came in 1956 in Henderson v. United
States. 178 The three appellants had been convicted of a conspiracy to
173. Id.
174. Id. Indeed, the court found a compelling reason for not making an exception to
the entrapment defense in that "[t]he primary function of entrapment is to safeguard
the integrity of the law enforcement and prosecution process." Id. This rationale, however, may be placing undue reliance on the minority/objective view of entrapment. See
523 F.2d at 988 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion
of the objective and subjective views of entrapment, see supra notes 18-72 and accompanying text.
The court suggested one further reason for overruling Eastman: "Continued adherence to Eastman would have generated serious constitutional problems by conditioning
the assertion of a defense on the defendant's yielding his presumption of innocence, his
right to remain silent, and his right to have the Government prove the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 523 F.2d at 986 (footnote omitted). The court was
careful, however, to admonish that it did not rest its decision on constitutional grounds.
Id.
175. 523 F.2d at 985.
176. Id. at 986.
177. One court has suggested that the Fifth Circuit has "begun to question the propriety of the general ban." United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1171 (2d Cir. 1980)
(footnote omitted).
178. 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956), noted in Comment, Criminal LawDefenses-Defense of Entrapment is Available in Federal Prosecution Although In·
ducement was by State Officer and Although Defendant Denies Acts Charged, supra
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violate certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which proscribed various activities relating to the distilling of moonshine whiskey.179 Henderson, the primary defendant, had become involved with a
government "plant" named Wood and the two of them commenced the
manufacture of illicit whiskey. At trial, Henderson admitted to his participation in the operation of the distillery, but denied that he was otherwise a party to the conspiracy with which he had been charged.180
The trial court denied Henderson's requested charge on entrapment,
despite clear evidence that his participation had been induced solely
by Wood, apparently based on its inconsistency with Henderson's denial of conspiratorial participation.181
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court in its reasoning
that Henderson's illegal acts did not "constitute him a conspirator unless he did so with some knowledge of the conspiracy,"182 and, therefore, that Henderson's denial of his participation in or knowledge of
the conspiracy would not be consistent with his claim that he was entrapped into committing that o:ffense.183 However, while it would have
been technically inconsistent for Henderson to plead both not guilty
and entrapment, the court reasoned that the real question necessitated
a shift in focus from the pleadings to the proof. In other words, actual
inconsistency could only be evaluated from proof adduced at trial and
could not be preliminarily assessed at the earlier pleading stage. Analogizing the criminal trial to the philosophical underpinnings of its civil
counterpart, the court acknowledged that "[t]he common goals of all
trials, civil and criminal, of issues of fact is to arrive at the truth, and it
would seem that inconsistent positions should be permitted or not permitted according to whether they might help or hinder a search for
note 152.
179. 237 F.2d at 170.
180. Id. at 171.
181. Id. Specifically, the court ruled:
I am going to deny your requested charge on entrapment because entrapment
insofar as Henderson is concerned I do not think it is applicable to him. I am
going to tell the jury insofar as he is concerned he denied every overt act with
which he is charged in this indictment other than those that connect him with
the operation of the stills.
Id. at 171 n.1.
182. Id. at 171 (footnote omitted).
183. Id. at 171-72. The court acknowledged that the trial court may well have relied
on earlier Fifth Circuit language holding that "[e]ntrapment is a valid, positive defense,
in certain circumstances, the invocation of which necessarily assumes that the act
charged was committed." Id. at 172 (quoting Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611,
614 (5th Cir. 1955)). While the court noted that the actual holding in Hamilton permitted the appellant to have the entrapment issue submitted to the jury, it recognized that
other courts had "definitely held that a defendant's denial of one specific act charged
••• would necessarily preclude him from relying on the defense of entrapment." 237
F.2d at 172 (footnotes omitted).
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truth."184 The standard-bearer in such a quest was reasonably perceived to be the degree of inconsistency.185
If the evidence fails to prove by the required standard that
the defendant committed the act charged or had the requisite
criminal intent, then, of course, the defense of entrapment is
unnecessary. Usually, however, that cannot be foretold when
the proof is being offered in advance of the jury's verdict.
Then, according to the circumstances and the nature of the
case, proof of entrapment may or may not be so contrary or
repugnant to proof that the defendant is otherwise not guilty,
or rather to a lack of the required proof that the defendant is
otherwise guilty, that the proof of one necessarily disproves the
other. 186

Applied to the case before it, the court observed that
[t]he defendant could admit operating the illicit still, deny being a party to the conspiracy charged, and still defend on the
ground that such overt acts as he did commit were done as a
result of entrapment; he could say, "I did not go so far as to
become a party to the conspiracy, but to the extent that I did
travel down the road to crime, I was entrapped." The two defenses do not seem to us so repugnant that proof of the one
necessarily disproves the other. 187
Accordingly, the court ruled that Henderson should have been afforded
an entrapment instruction and reversed his conviction, remanding for a
new trial. 188
In Sears v. United States,1 89 decided nine years after Henderson,
a second exception to the rule against inconsistency emerged. While
recognizing that "where commission of the crime is denied, the evidentiary base for the defense of entrapment will usually be lacking,ni9 o the
184. 237 F.2d at 172.
185. Id.
In most common law jurisdictions, prior to the advent of statutes or rules like
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the admissibility of inconsistent pleadings
in civil actions depended upon their degree of inconsistency. • • • "The test of
inconsistency inhibited, whether merely an inconsistency or an inconsistency
that is contradictory or repugnant, is whether the proof of one necessarily disproves the other. It is no test that if one is proved the other is unnecessary."
Id. (quoting 71 C.J.S. Pleadings § 125, at 275-76 (1951)) (italics in C.J.S. as subsection
heading).
186. 237 F.2d at 172-73 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 173.
188. Id. at 173, 177.
189. 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965).
190. Id. at 143.
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court nonetheless found the situation possible where substantial evidence of entrapment was introduced by testimony of the government's
own witnesses. In such a case, the defendant would not be talring an
inconsistent position in the sense of offering entrapment evidence contradicting his primary defense that he didn't commit the crime. More
specifically, the court held that
where, as here, the government's own case in chief injected
substantial evidence of entrapment into the case, the defendant is entitled to raise the defense by motion for acquital and
by requested instruction to the jury. We do not think it is impermissibly inconsistent for a defendant to deny the acts
charged, yet urge the court on motion for acquital that the government's own evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of
law. . . . We feel that the ultimate goal of the criminal trial,
the ascertainment of truth, permits no other course. A criminal
defendant should not forfeit what may be a valid defense, nor
should the court ignore what may be improper conduct by law
enforcement officers, merely because the defendant elected to
put the government to its proof.191
The aftermath of Sears saw a limitation of its holding in attempts
to align the decision with Henderson. In both Beatty v. United
States 192 and McCarty v. United States, 198 the Sears test was expressly qualified and held to be applicable only in those situations
where a defendant admits having committed the overt acts but denies
any participation in the conspiracy.194
Later cases limit the exception even further.m In United States v.
191. Id. at 143-44 (citation omitted).
192. 377 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 45 (1967).
193. 379 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967).
194. The Beatty court noted that "Sears is factually distinguishable from the present
case. In Sears, the defendant charged with conspiracy introduced the issue of entrapment in regard to a particular overt criminal act and the court held that his defense of
entrapment was not inconsistent with his denial of the charge of conspiracy." 377 F.2d at
186 n.9. Likewise, the McCarty court observed that in both Sears and Henderson,
proof that the defendant was not a member of a conspiracy would not have necessarily disproved that he was entrapped into committing a particular overt act.
In the instant case, however, proof that McCarty did not commit the acts constituting the sole offense charged necessarily disproves that he was entrapped into
doing the offense. We hold this to be too great a degree of inconsistency in defenses to be permitted.
379 F.2d at 286-87 (citations and footnote omitted). See also United States v. Valencia,
645 F.2d 1158, 1171 n.16 (2d Cir. 1980) (Sears limited to cases in which defendant admits committing overt acts, but denies participation in a conspiracy).
195. At least one decision appears to represent a rather generous reading of the rule's
exception. United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933
(1971), would permit the entrapment defense where a defendant does not admit to par-
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O'Leary, 196 the court restricted the availability of inconsistent defenses
to situations where a defendant admits to a culpable, overt act; admission of purely innocent conduct on the part of a defendant would not
be sufficient to catapult the defendant outside the rule against such
defenses. 197 United States v. Morrow 196 limits the holding of Sears
solely to cases where the government's own case-in-chief injects substantial evidence to support a theory of entrapment.199
Despite these limitations, a more recent Fifth Circuit holding suggests the possibility of at least one new exception. United States v.
Greenfield, 200 decided in 1977, held that a defendant could raise the
defense of entrapment if he admitted the physical acts alleged but denied any criminal intent.201 Noting that the "rule in this circuit ... is
not unbending,"202 the court rationalized that the "entrapment defense
is not so inconsistent with the defense of lack of intent under the circumstances of this case as to preclude the alternative defenses."203
Finally, despite the Fifth Circuit's continued adherence to the
rule, there has appeared language evincing some concern over its continued vitality. While not suggesting its abandonment, the court in
United States v. Daniels204 acknowledged that "[t]his theory justifiaticipation in the acts as long as he has not taken the stand to deny the acts so that "no
evidence inconsistent with the defense of entrapment was introduced." Id. at 605.
196. 529 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1976).
197. Id. at 1203. See also United States v. Newcomb, 488 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974). In Newcomb, the court of appeals reiterated the rule
expressed in Henderson, that rationally there could not be a defense of entrapment when
the defendants only admitted innocent acts.
198. 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
199. Id. at 138-39.
200. 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
201. Id. at 182-83.
202. Id. at 182.
203. Id. at 183. Greenfield, a physician, was convicted of distributing a controlled
substance without a legitimate medical purpose in violation of a federal statute. In conforming to the aspiration articulated in Henderson and Sears that the ultimate goal of
the criminal trial was the ascertainment of truth, see supra notes 178 & 184 and accompanying text, the Greenfield court recognized that
[n]ecessarily, the issue of criminal intent or guilty knowledge was a factual issue
for the jury to resolve on the basis of circumstantial evidence under the totality
of the circumstances. It was a subjective determination.
We do not believe that it is impermissibly inconsistent under these circumstances for a defendant also to argue that to the extent that the jury may find
culpability on his part, he was entrapped . • • • That is, he may argue that he
did not knowingly dispense the drugs without a legitimate medical purpose or,
alternatively, he may argue that to the extent that he may have prescribed without a legitimate medical purpose, he was not predisposed to do so.
554 F.2d at 183.
204. 572 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978).
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bly has been attacked by this court and by other courts."205 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit has yet to relinquish entirely its established
doctrine. 206
In claiming it need "go no further than the Fifth Circuit,"207 the
Second Circuit has both implicitly conformed its decisions to one of
the Fifth Circuit exceptions, as well as evaded almost entirely its task
of setting a definitive precedent. Despite having confronted the question in decisions dating back thirty years,208 the Second Circuit has yet
to speak conclusively on the subject. While two early cases209 seemed to
have suggested the circuit would take a restrictive approach to the
question, that position was called into question by United States v.
Bishop 210 and thenceforth treated as an open question.211 The most ex205. Id. at 542 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit noted that the rule against raising entrapment as an alternative defense could not be justified solely by the inconsistency theory since criminal defendants are permitted to assert inconsistent defenses in
other contexts. Id.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1118 (1982); United States v. Crossman, 663 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Sedigh, 658 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 351 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). These decisions consistently denied
the entrapment defense where the defendant did not admit committing the acts on
which the prosecution was predicated.
207. United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Swiderski, 559 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 544 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Braver,
450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972); United States v. Alford,
373 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1967); United States v. Bishop, 367
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Pagano, 207 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1953).
209. United States v. Dillonna, 276 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1960) (affirming refusal by the
trial court to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense where the defendant denied
having knowledge of the criminal act); United States v. Pagano, 207 F.2d 884 (2d Cir.
1953) (refusal to charge as to entrapment was not erroneous where the defendant did not
admit having committed the crime).
210. 367 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1966). The Bishop court expressly declined to address
the question whether an entrapment defense would be foreclosed by failure to admit the
criminal acts. The court did hold, however, that a defendant must give the court or prosecution reasonable notice that such a defense would be raised, or otherwise be precluded
from raising the defense for the first time on appeal. Id.
211. United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d at 1170. In United States v. Alford, 373 F.2d
508 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1967), the court indicated that whether a defendant was entitled "both to deny the transaction and 'to urge that if the jury believed it
did occur the the [sic] government's evidence as to how it occurred indicated entrapment' was an open question in the circuit." Id. at 509 (quoting Hansford v. United
States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962)). The question was again left open in United
States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 802 n.7 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. detiied, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972)
and likewise in United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975). Finally,
in United States v. Swiderski, 539 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1976), the circuit reiterated its evasive position of the last 20 years. Id. at 859 & n.4; see also United States v. Brown, 544
F.2d 1155, 1159 (2d Cir. 1976). It may be plausible to suggest that with the decision in
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tensive early discussion is found in United States v. Swiderski, 212 decided in 1976. Unfortunately, even there little light is shed on the circuit's position,213 as the court found defendant's testimony to be not
inconsistent with a claim of entrapment.21"
Not until 1980, in United.States v. Valencia, 21 r. did the Second
Circuit attempt to articulate to any substantial degree its policy with
respect to inconsistent defenses. The two defendants in Valencia had
been convicted in the district court on three counts of possessing, distributing, and conspiring to distribute cocaine.216 One issue on appeal
Brown, early indications of the circuit's changed position start to appear, notwithstanding language in the opinion that the issue in the case before it "need not be decided in
the.instant case and remains an open question in this circuit." Id. What the court did
hold, however, was that the defendant was entitled to rely on ostensibly inconsistent
defenses since each related to "two distinct and different periods of time within the life
of the conspiracy." Id. Specifically, the entrapment defense was held to relate to an initial purchase of drugs, the major event of the conspiracy. Lack of intent, urged by the
defendant as a defense to the conspiracy charge, however, was found to relate to subse·
quent events. "Since tliese defenses related to different time periods, they were not inconsistent." Id.
Judge Bartels, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the majority's reversal of the
conviction, but would have based the decision on the rule adopted by the district court
in Sylvia v. United States, 312 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir.}, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963},
prohibiting inconsistent or alternative defenses. Citing decisions of the Fourth, Sixtli,
and District of Columbia Circuits, Judge Bartels was persuaded that a defendant be permitted to use inconsistent defenses. 544 F.2d at 1162 (Bartels, J., concurring} (citing
Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962} (en bane} (for a discussion
of Hansford, see infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text); Crisp v. United States, 262
F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1958) (for a discussion of Crisp, see infra note 237 and accompanying text); Scriber v. United States, 2 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1925) (for a discussion of
Scriber, and the eventual change in the Sixth Circuit's position, see supra note 143 and
accompanying text).
·
212. 539 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976).
213. See supra note 211.
214. The defendant testified that she and her fiance co-defendant had been lured to a
party in a hotel room where she was induced to aid her fiance in the purchase of cocaine
because of the fear instilled in her by the government informer. United States v. Swiderski, 539 F.2d at 858-59. The court stated that "[u]nder these circumstances, the evidence
that she went to the hotel under a false invitation by the government agent, and not for
the purpose of purchasing cocaine, was enough to make the issue of entrapment one for
the jury." Id. at 859. The court did not find this claim of entrapment inconsistent with
defendant's claim that she did not commit the offense of aiding and abetting her codefendant as charged. Id.
215. 645 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1980). Interestingly enough, the question of inconsistent
defenses was but an ancillary issue before the court. The major thrust of the opinion
concerned the issue of vicarious entrapment, that is, whether or not a defendant may
urge the entrapment defense having been induced not directly by a government agent,
but, ratlier, by a co-defendant. Id. at 1168-70.
216. Id. at 1160. Defendant William Valencia was acquitted on count one, charging
him with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Defendant Olga Valencia was convicted on all
three counts. Id.
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concerned the government's contention that the defense of entrapment
should not be available to a defendant who completely denied having
participated in the criminal enterprise.217 After extensive discussion of
the divergent views of the other circuits,218 and a recognition that its
own decisions had theretofore consistently reserved the question,219 the
court was prepared to take at least a limited position. It wrote that
where the circuits appear to be in conflict, our own cases are
not altogether consistent, and the Supreme Court cases do not
ad4i:ess the question,[220] we hold that William Valencia, hav217. Id. at 1170.
218. Id. at 1170-72 & nn.12-17.
219. Id. at 1170; see supra note 211.
220. Arguably, the Supreme Court opinions do address the issue, if only implicitly,
and even then without any real cohesion among the opinions. The clearest indication of
at least one justice's position is found in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), discussed supra at notes 42-48 and accompanying text. In detailing his view as to the basis
of the entrapment defense, Justice Frankfurter suggested that "[t]he courts refuse to
convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of
the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf
of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced." Id. at 380
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). While certainly the Justice was not entertaining a question as to the availability of inconsistent defenses, his remarks are telling. Usage of the phrase "even if his guilt be admitted" suggests the clear possibility of
allowing the entrapment defense in all cases, i.e., whether guilt be admitted or denied.
Unfortunately, this may be a rather parochial reading of the term "admitted." It is debatable whether Justice Frankfurter used the word as referring to the admission by the
defendant of his guilt, or, in a sense of denoting recognition by the court of the defendant's guilt, in which case no allusion to inconsistent defenses may rightfully be imputed
to such language. See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495, 496 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting} (adopting Justice Frankfurter's analysis), discussed supra notes
79-82 and accompanying text.
Support, though somewhat less clear, is also found in Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435 (1932), discussed supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text. In rejecting the
government's contention that the defense of entrapment was properly raised only by a
special plea in bar, Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
This contention presupposes that the defense is available to the accused and
relates only to the manner in which it shall be presented. The Government considers the defense as analogous to a plea of pardon or of autrefois convict or
autrefois acquit. It is assumed that the accused is not denying his guilt but is
setting up special facts in bar upon which he relies regardless of his guilt or
innocence of the crime charged. This, as we have seen, is a misconception. The
defense is avail.able, not in the view that the accused though guilty may go free,
but that the Government cannot be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a
crime where the government officials are the instigators of his conduct.
Id. at 452 (emphasis added). At least one reasonable inference to be drawn from the
language of the Chief Justice is that entrapment as a defense does remain available to a
defendant who denies his guilt.
Finally, and contrary to the opinions discussed above, attention is directed to the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439
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ing put the Government on notice in counsel's opening statement of the assertion of the dual defens es of entrapment and
non-involvement, is entitled to raise the defense of entrapment
since he did not take the stand to deny personally his participation in the transaction and did not affirmatively introduce
any other evidence that he was not involved.221
Apparently on uncomfortable ground, the court sought to equate its
position with the moderate approach taken by the Fifth Circuit:m
In reaching this conclusion, we need go no further than the
Fifth Circuit in making the entrapment defense available to a
defendant who, having duly notified the Government of the assertion of dual defenses, chooses not to testify and does not
introduce any evidence inconsistent with the defens~ of
entrapment.223

Judge Van Graafeiland, concurring in part and dissenting in
part,22' reasoned that because there was no error in the trial court's
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting), discussed supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Arguing that "since by definition, the entrapment defense cannot arise unless the defendant actually committed the proscribed act," Justice Stewart seems, at least implicitly,
to suggest the impossibility of urging inconsistent defenses. Id. at 442. That is, to the
extent the entrapment defense presumes the guilt of the defendant, it cannot be advanced except by an admitting defendant.
221. 645 F.2d at 1172 (footnote omitted). The court went on to note:
Although William's counsel in summation articulated his client's position that
William was in no way involved in the sale of cocaine and although counsel's
examination of Olga was only to elicit the response from her that William never
had anything at all to do with cocaine, that is insufficient to withdraw the entrapment from William.
Id. The suggestion implicit in the excerpted language is reasonably understood to permit
the introduction of at least some evidence of non-participation as long as such evidence
is not in the form of testimony from the accused. Even this reading is uncertain, however, in light of the opinion's next paragraph, ostensibly precluding the use of any inconsistent evidence. See infra text accompanying note 223.
222. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's holdings, see supra notes 178-206 and
accompanying text.
223. 645 F.2d at 1172 (footnote and citations omitted). The court continued: "We
therefore need not decide whether we would follow the District of Columbia, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits in making the entrapment defense available to a defendant who actually
testifies that he did not participate in the alleged criminill activity or uses alibi witnesses
to make the same point." Id. Like the court in Demma, see supra text accompanying
note 175, the Second Circuit recognized that "[s]ince an entrapment defense still cannot
be raised without some evidence of inducement by a government agent, a defendant who
wishes to argue entrapment will often, as a practical matter, still have to admit participation in the criminal activity notwithstanding the rule that we have announced." Id. at
1172 n.19 (citation omitted). In the case before it, however, the defendant was able to
raise the defense because of evidence introduced by his co-defendant. Id.
224. 645 F.2d at 1172 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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charge on entrapment, "it was unnecessary for the majority to reach
out and decide the issue of inconsistent defenses." 225 However, because
his colleagues saw fit to do so, Judge Van Graafeiland felt compelled to
add his own comments. Essentially, Judge Van Graafeiland was concerned only with the procedural question of at what point the entrapment defense may be raised. Specifically, he suggested that "if a defendant is to be permitted to rely on these inconsistent defenses, he
should make clear his intention to do so. He should not be permitted
to claim only lack of involvement and then, after the proofs are closed,
ask for a charge on entrapment."226 Once the issue of entrapment has
been raised, the government has the burden of establishing the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime.227 It is therefore essential
that the government be allowed to offer such evidence. "Defense counsel should not be allowed to manuever the Government out of introducing whatever proof it has on the issue of defendant's predisposition. " 228
The Eighth Circuit has arguably adopted a posture not unlike that
of the Second Circuit, expressly leaving the question undecided despite
earlier cases suggesting the impermissibility of inconsistent defenses.229
More recent cases, however, suggest that the court may be creeping
into accord with the restrictive jurisdictions.230
While the moderate approaches taken by these quasi-restrictive
jurisdictions are to be commended as attempts to free enlightened ju225. Id. at 1176.
226. Id. Cf. United States v. Bishop, 367 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1966), discussed supra
note 210.
227. United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1972), held that evidence showing acts similar to those charged was admissible to show defendant's intent to violate the
law and to negate the defense of entrapment. Id. at 745. The court in United States v.
Koska, 443 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), found "[t]he evidence was relevant to show the
propensity and predisposition of appellant to commit the crime charged in order to
counter appellant's defense of entrapment." Id. at 1169.
228. 645 F.2d at 1176 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citation omitted).
229. Ware v. United States, 259 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1958), held that a defendant who
had denied the commission of a crime was precluded from asserting the claim of entrapment. Id. at 445. In Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 931 (1967), the court noted the existence of "considerable authority" holding inconsistent defenses unavailable to a criminal defendant, but declined "to make a full review
of that issue." Id. at 601. The court found as a matter of law that entrapment could not
be proven and therefore was reluctant to inject itself into what it perceived to be troubled waters. Id.
230. See, e.g., Gipson v. Lockhart, 692 F.2d 66, 68 (8th Cir. 1982) (under Arkansas
law, defendant must admit crime to claim entrapment) (citing Brown v. State, 248 Ark.
561, 562, 453 S.W.2d 50, 52 (1970)); United States v. Kutrip, 670 F.2d 870, 876-77 (8th
Cir. 1982) (failure to instruct on entrapment not error where defense would be
inconsistent).
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dicial thought from the shackles of poor reasoning, one may question
whether such efforts have carried the torch far enough. Notwithstanding their liberalization of the inconsistency rule (to the point of allowing inconsistent defenses in situations where a defendant at least
has not denied the criminal act), these courts still would preclude a
defendant from offering exculpatory testimony on his own behalf
should he choose to advance an entrapment defense. In contradistinction to the results that obtain in the restrictive jurisdictions, that is, a
forced surrender of the right against self-incrimination and an evaporated presumption of innocence, here, the undesirable consequences of
the rule effectuate rather opposite ills; for now, a defendant is foreclosed, indeed denied, the opportunity to testify in negation of his own
guilt. One's skepticism in acceding to such a position would of course
be wholly justified; so limiting the options of the criminal defendant
bespeaks a less than casual respect for the right to offer evidence on
one's own behalf. To put the argument in other terms, a defendant
wishing to argue entrapment must nonetheless be entitled to rebut any
evidence of guilt offered by the prosecution. This must necessarily include the right to personally controvert the prosecution's case.231
It would seem, then, that even moderate attempts to limit the avenues of defense run afoul of some rather basic principles of fairness.
Thus, we turn now to the permissive jurisdictions.
C. Permissive Jurisdictions
Only two circuits have steadfastly and continuously rejected application of the inconsistency rule since it first emerged in the federal
courts in 1923.232 The most frequently cited case authority in support
of abandonment of the rule has traditionally been the en bane decision
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Hansford v.
United States. 288 While not generous in analysis, the Hansford court234
held a defendant's twofold defense, that he did not sell any narcotics
but that if he did he had been entrapped, to be not inconsistent.2311 The
231. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (defendant has right to
present testimony in his own behalf); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)
(same); cf. People v. Keel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 298, 299, 267 P.2d 161, 163 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928);
People v. Degnen, 70 Cal. App. 567, 591, 234 P. 129, 139 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925) (holding
defendant has the obligation to object to the use of certain evidence in order to reserve
the right to appeal on that issue).
232. The Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits have rejected the inconsistency
rule. See, e.g., Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane); Crisp
v. United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958). But see supra note 132.
233. 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane).
234. The decision of the en bane panel was unanimous. The Hansford opinion was
joined by Chief Justice (then Judge) Warren Burger. Id. at 219.
235. Id. at 221.
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court reasoned that "[t]he defenses were alternative but not inconsistent. It was consistent with defendant's denial of the transaction to
urge that if the jury believed it did occur the government's evidence as
to how it occurred indicated entrapment."236
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, equally terse in its analysis, has long
held: "We think it perfectly proper to allow a criminal defendant to
submit to a jury alternative defenses" of denial of guilt and
entrapment. 237
The most outspoken permissive circuit seems to be the Ninth,
commencing with and following its decision in United States v.
Demma. 238 Equally deserving of attention, however, are some of California's more prominent state court decisions and their denunciation of
the inconsistency rule. One of the most. well-reasoned opinions is that
of then Chief Justice Traynor speaking for the California Supreme
236. Id. See also United States v. Neuman, 436 F.2d 285, 286 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (expressly affirmed Hansford and allowed alternative
defenses).
237. Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68, 69 (4th Cir. 1958).
The District of Columbia and the Fourth Circuits have characterized the defense as
one properly viewed as an "alternative." Paradoxically, this both begs the question and
suggests a resolution. Such a construction is tautological in that alternativity does not
avoid the fundamental inconsistency with which the restrictive jurisdictions are concerned, but rather assumes it away. Even conceding that the two defenses are not urged
simultaneously, the ultimate result is nonetheless to permit a defendant to argue antithetical positions. However, precisely because the positions are posited alternatively, indeed, somewhat hypothetically, any inconsistency becomes at once less objectionable
(e.g., to a logic-insistent juror) and wholly proper. To the extent an alternative defense is
based upon uncertainty as to which set of facts a jury will ultimately hold to be true,
there is simply no reason to reject out of hand any one of the two proffered defenses.
Since both defenses may prove to be true, inconsistency is more appropriately determined by a verdict than in a pleading. See infra notes 276-88 and accompanying text.
This reasoning, of course, requires a defendant to structure his defenses in an "even if''
mode, and precludes any conjunctive assertions. That is, the defendant must claim "I
did not commit the crime, but, if the evidence suggests otherwise, then I was entrapped."
He may not contend "I did not commit the crime and I was entrapped." The distinction,
though subtle, arguably even trivial, is essential to legitimate the ostensible
inconsistency.
238. 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). For a discussion of Demma, see supra
notes 154-76 and accompanying text. Since 1975, Demma has been consistently reaffirmed in unequivocal terms. See, e.g., United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 965 (9th Cir.
1978) ("alternative defenses, of course, are proper, even if inconsistent"); United States
v. Pico-Zazueta, 564 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1977) ("a defendant may assert entrapment without conceding that he did the acts charged"); United States v. Paduano, 549
F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Under Demma, 'a defendant may assert entrapment without being required to concede that he committed the crime or any of its elements.' ")
(quoting Demma, 523 F.2d at 982); United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir.
1976) (a defendant is not required to "admit the offense as a condition to his asserting
entrapment"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
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Court in People v. Perez. 239 The language of Justice Traynor deserves
extended quotation:
We disagree with the . . . contention that to invoke the defense of entrapment a defendant must admit committing the
criminal act charged. Although the defense is available to a defendant who is otherwise guilty . . . it does not follow that the
defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense. A defendant, for example may deny that he committed every element
of the crime charged, yet properly allege that such acts as he
did commit were induced by law enforcement officers. Moreover, a defendant may properly contend that the evidence
shows unlawful police conduct amounting to entrapment without conceding that it also shows his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . Entrapment is recognized as a defense because
"the court refuses to enable officers of the law to consummate
illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster rather than prevent
and detect crime." A rule designed to deter such unlawful conduct cannot properly be restricted by compelling a defendant
to incriminate himself as a condition to invoking the rule. . . .
To compel a defendant to admit guilt as a condition to invoking the defense of entrapment would compel him to relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the risk of not being able to meet his burden of
proving entrapment. To put the defendant in that dilemma
would frustrate the assertion of the defense itself and would
thus undermine its policy.240
239. 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965).
240. Id. at 773, 401 P.2d at 937-38, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30 (quoting People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 9, 345 P.2d 928, 933 (1959)) (citations omitted). At least one lower
California court had posited a similar rationale at least 10 years earlier. People v. West,
139 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 923, 926, 293 P.2d 166, 168 (Super. Ct. 1956) ("A defendant may
present inconsistent defenses. We find nothing in any of the cases cited, or read, which
raises a doubt in our minds that a defendant who, as a witness, denies some essential
element of an offense charged, may nevertheless have the benefit of evidence that she
was entrapped into committing the offense."). Until the Perez decision, however, the
California courts had generally taken the position that the denial of the criminal act was
inconsistent with the defenses of entrapment and therefore not permitted. See People v.
Wallace, 199 Cal. App. 2d 678, 681-82, 18 Cal. Rptr. 917, 918-19 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
People v. Lee, 9 Cal. App. 2d 99, 109, 48 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935). For an
analysis of the various California views, see Note, The Defense of Entrapment in Cali·
fornia, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 825 (1968); Comment, Criminal Law-Denial of Act and En·
trapment as Inconsistent Defenses, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 542 (1957).
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A similar position seems to have been adopted in the New York
courts.241 In People v. Johnston, 2 ' 2 the court was quite specific in holding that "in New York a defendant may raise inconsistent defenses and
may n~t be compelled to admit his guilt as a condition of invoking the
defense of entrapment."243 The focus of the opinion seemingly centered, at least implicitly, on constitutional grounds. The trial court had
instructed the jury that by claiming the defense of entrapment, the
defendants had conceded their participation in the crime for which
they stood accused. 244 In holding this instruction erroneous, the appellate division noted that the "basic and fundamental error in this instruction is obvious for it asserted the guilt of defendants as a fact,
thus relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and afforded defendants an opportunity for
an acquittal only if they proved their defense of entrapment."2411
While a review of all state jurisdictional views would not be practical, it is sufficient to note that a number of state courts are in accord
with the general permissive view.246
While, quantitatively, the permissive jurisdictions represent somewhat of a minority view on the subject, it may be argued that in terms
of substantive analysis, it is this position which should ultimately prevail. This suggestion is treated at length in the following section.

IV.

THE VALIDITY OF THE INCONSISTENT ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

To be sure, however rational it may be to permit the assertion of
inconsistent defenses, as a practical matter, in most instances, it will be
unwise for a defendant brazenly to pursue such a course. Given that a
241. See, e.g., People v. Chambers, 56 Misc.2d 683, 289 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968). But see People v. Ottomanelli, 74 A.D.2d 653, 425 N.Y.S.2d 38 (2d Dep't 1980);
People v. Martin, 66 A.D.2d 995, 411 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1978).
242. 47 A.D.2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1975).
243. Id. at 901, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (citations omitted).
244. Id. at 900, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
245. Id. at 901, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
246. See, e.g., Stripling v. State, 349 So. 2d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1978); State v. Harrington, 332 So. 2d 764 (La. 1976); State v.
Branam, 161 N.J. Super. 53, 390 A.2d 1186 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 79 N.J. 301, 399 A.2d
299 (1979); State v. McBride, 287 Or. 315, 599 P.2d 449 (1979); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d
496 (Utah 1979); State v. Nelson, 89 S.D. 1, 228 N.W.2d 143 (1975); see also UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-303(3) (1976) ("The defense provided by this section is available even
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.").
But see McCarroll v. State, 294 Ala. 87, 312 So. 2d 382 (1975); Brown v. State, 248 Ark.
561, 453 S.W.2d 50 (1970); McKibben v. State, 115 Ga. App. 598, 155 S.E.2d 449 (Ct.
App. 1967); People v. Anthony, 28 ill. 2d 65, 190 N.E.2d 837 (1963); People v. Davis, 53
Mich. App. 94, 218 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Sykes, 478 S.W.2d 387 (Mo.
1972); State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957); State v. Hsie, 36 Ohio App. 2d
99, 303 N.E.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1973).
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defendant's ultimate fate will rest essentially in the hands of the jurors, credibility, and not procedural legerdemain, will often prove to be
his most potent weapon. Indeed, a defendant will often be "ill-advised
as a matter of tactics to deny that the act was done. To make that
denial in the face of overwhelming proof destroys whatever credibility
the defendant might have had when he gave his version of the entrapment facts." 2 ·17
Whatever value this pragmatic approach may possess, it is important to bear in mind that our more fundamental concern must be with
the theoretic and normative issue of the doctrine's place in our criminal jurisprudence. In short, the question that remains is whether a
court may justifiably (and, perhaps, constitutionally) 248 deny a defendant the privilege (right?) of asserting inconsistent defenses. In addressing this concern, a number of issues immediately present themselves, each of which will be discussed in turn.
A. Constitutional Concerns
While it has long been established that the entrapment defense
per se is not to be accorded constitutional status,249 the possibility re247. Groot, supra note 31, at 263 (footnote omitted). See United States v. Brown, 544
F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1976) (Bartels, J., concurring) ("good defense tactics" to concentrate on entrapment defense); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975)
(en bane) (high risk makes use of inconsistent defenses unlikely as a strategic matter)
(For a discussion of Demma, see supra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.); Johnson v.
United States, 426 F.2d 651, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (although a defendant has the right to
argue inconsistent defenses, "it would not be surprising if this position reflected unfavorably on Appellant's credibility"); People v. Johnson, 47 A.D.2d 897, 900, 366 N.Y.S.2d
198, 203 (2d Dep't 1975) ("Entrapment is obviously a defense fraught with great risk to a
defendant who seeks its benefits and at the same time also denies commission of the acts
charged"); Cronin, supra note 73, at 1236 (a defendant's assertion of inconsistent defenses "risks undermining the credibility of his entire defense"); Park, supra note 17, at
257 n.308 ("Such a posture would normally be unwise ••••");Ranney, supra note 17, at
164 ("offering inconsistent defenses can only destroy [defendant's] credibility with the
trier of fact"); Note, Entrapment, supra note 152, at 1343 (inconsistent testimony is
"always deterred by perjury sanctions and by even minimal respect for the intelligence of
the jury").
248. For a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of denying a criminal defendant the use of inconsistent defenses, see infra notes 249-75 and accompanying text.
249. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's refusal to elevate the defense of entrapment to constitutional status, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text; see also
Cronin, supra note 73, at 1237 & n.212 ("The entrapment defense is not constitutionally
mandated and is therefore subject to congressional revision."); Orfield, supra note 17, at
53-57 ("The defense of entrapment in the federal courts exists without any judicially
articulated basis in the Constitution • • . • [T]he courts have balked at elevating the
defense to constitutional dimensions."); Comment, The Assertion of Inconsistent De·
fenses in Entrapment Cases, supra note 123, at 688 ("The entrapment defense has no
judicially affirmed constitutional basis."). But see Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in
the Federal Courts and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. Cm!lf. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
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mains that some of the doctrine's ancillary applications, particularly
procedural ones, will call into question some rather fundamental constitutional issues. The most devastating constitutional infirmity is suggested by the theory that prohibiting the use of inconsistent defenses
may well obscure, if not remove entirely, the presumption of innocence.250 To the extent the inconsistency rule compels a defendant to
admit his guilt or forgo an entrapment instruction, the prosecution is
relieved of its burden of proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
whenever a defendant has forcibly admitted to the crime's commission.251 This scenario is palpably in conflict with the due process requirement that the innocence of the accused be presumed.252 Since
"the prosecution must have the burden of proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the inconsistency rule, by requiring an admission of crime in order to have an entrapment instruction
..."violates due process by "reliev[ing] the prosecution of any practical burden of proving the crime. . . ."253
POL. Ser. 447, 449 (1959) (constitutional theories applied in fact); Note, The Serpent
Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74
YALE L.J. 942, 949-52 (1965) (analogizing entrapment to coerced confessions). See generally Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA.
L. REv. 63 (1967) (suggesting a constitutional basis for the entrapment defense).
250. Groot, supra note 31, at 269. The most glaring example of the denial of the
presumption of innocence may be found in the theory that absent commission of a crime
there can be no entrapment. While as an abstract matter this is entirely correct, it ignores the fact that in any particular case the guilt of a defendant pleading entrapment is
presumed without any attempt to decide the question of guilt or innocence.
251. Admittedly, in the general case, when a defendant pleads guilty the prosecution
is also relieved of its burden; none would suggest a due process violation in these cases.
Here, however, the defendant is procedurally coerced into a posture which is greatly at
odds with his ultimate position of claiming innocence. That is to say, he wants to plead
not guilty but must sacrifice that option in the hopes of convincing the jury that he was
in fact entrapped. See, e.g., Sylvia v. United States, 312 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir.) ("[A]
defendant's testimony to the effect that he did not commit the crime cannot raise an
issue of entrapment."), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963). This case is therefore manifestly distinguishable from the normal entry of a guilty plea. The issue of coercion is
more fully discussed infra notes 255-75 and accompanying text.
252. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there
is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.").
253. Groot, supra note 31, at 271 (footnote omitted). See also United States v.
Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane) ("Continued adherence to Eastman
would have generated serious constitutional problems by conditioning the assertion of a
defense on the defendant's yielding his presumption of innocence, his right to remain
silent, and his right to have the Government prove the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt."); People v. Johnston, 47 A.D.2d 897, 900, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198, 203 (2d
Dep't 1975) ("The basic and fundamental error in this instruction is obvious, for it asserted the guilt of the defendants as a fact, thus relieving the prosecution of its burden
of proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and afforded defendants an opportunity
cc
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In essence, the focus of the jury will have been redirected, away
from consideration of the crime itself and turned solely to the issue of
entrapment. While, technically, the prosecution must still now prove
non-entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt,2 G• the presumption of innocence has been effectively eviscerated.2 GG
A second constitutional concern, and certainly at least equally as
'important as the evaporated presumption of innocence, is the effect
the inconsistency rule has in presenting to a defendant the Hobson's
choice of having to forfeit certain constitutional rights in order to avail
himself of the entrapment defense. More particularly, in those jurisdictions which observe the rule, a defendant wishing to plead entrapment
will be required as a matter of law to surrender his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination2 G6 and its corollary prohibition of
coerced confessions.2 G7 While only the briefest mention of this constitutional defect has been made by the courts,2 Gs a number of commentafor an acquittal only if they proved their defense of entrapment.").
254. For a discussion of the burden of proof of non-entrapment, see supra notes 15963 and accompanying text. The defendant generally retains the burden of production. W.
LAFAVE & A. ScOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 373 n.28 (1972). An exception arises when "the
Government's case-in-chief discloses entrapment as a matter of law (an unusual phenomenon),'' in which case, the "defendant must come forward with evidence of his non-predisposition and of government inducement." United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985
(9th Cir. 1975) (en bane) (citation mnitted).
255. Professor Groot offers a more comprehensive version of this argument. See
Groot, supra note 31, at 269-71.
256. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to both federal and state
prosecutions and has been recognized as a limitation upon the permissible reach of the
substantive criminal law. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 161 (1972). The
policies and purposes of the privilege reflect the "preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice." 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §
391, at 2 (C.E. Torcia 12th ed. 1975). See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)
("[T]he American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and
• • • the Fifth Amendment privilege is its mainstay. • • • Governments, state and federal,
are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and
freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own
mouth.") (citations omitted).
257. The prohibition against coerced confessions stems from society's general abhorrence of techniques of coercion and from the belief that statements given involuntarily
are unreliable evidence. c. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE l63
(1978). The Supreme Court has stated that a confession is free and voluntaey if it is "not
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
258. See United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980) (reversing the
district court's ruling that the defendant could not both refuse to take the stand and
claim entrapment; "to hold otherwise would raise a serious fifth amendment question").
But see State v. Montano, 117 Ariz. 145, 148, 571 P.2d 291, 294 (Ct. App. 1977) (requir-
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tors have offered persuasive argumentation suggesting it as ample reason for rejecting the inconsistency rule. ~ 9 These arguments generally
take as their starting point analogous Supreme Court doctrines which
have struck down as unconstitutional similar forced choices. While it is
well-established that a criminal defendant may legitimately be put to
tactical choices,260 it is equally well-settled that certain forced choices
are indeed unconstitutional. 261 The major Supreme Court pronounce2

ing a defendant to admit the substantial elements of a crime before allowing him to raise
the defense of entrapment does not violate the fifth amendment).
259. Groot, supra note 31, at 271-74; Nagle, supra note 95, at 125; Note, Denial of
the Crime and the Availability of the Entrapment Defense in the Federal Courts, 22
B.C.L. REV. 911, 930-31 (1981); Comment, The Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in
Entrapment Cases, supra note 123, at 690-91; Comment, Entrapment-A Call for the
Elimination of the Ninth Circuit Prohibition Against Pleading Inconsistent Defenses, 4
Sw. U.L. REV. 121, 131 (1972); Comment, United States v. Demma: Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases Allowed, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 962, 967.
260. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967) (testifying defendant
risks impeachment); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-57 (1958) (testifying defendant risks cross examination); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 164-66 (1954)
(testifying defendant risks supporting government's case). One of the most thorough Supreme Court analyses of this issue is found in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
In Corbitt, the Court rejected appellant's contention that a New Jersey statute, which
imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment upon conviction of first degree murder when tried to a jury while allowing for a sentence of less than life imprisonment
upon a plea of non vult, was unconstitutional. The Court noted that its cases "have
clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and
not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid." Id. at 218 (footnote omitted). The Court relied on its earlier decision in McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971) where it held:
The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations
requiring "the making of difficult judgments" as to which course to follow•.••
Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to
follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.
439 U.S. at 218-19 n.8 (quoting 402 U.S. at 213).
The Court quoted Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), in which it was held
that "[w]hile confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly
may have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'-and permissible-'attribute of any
legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.' " 439 U.S at
220 (quoting 412 U.S. at 31). In conclusion, the Corbitt Court stated:
It cannot be said that defendants found guilty by a jury are "penali2ed" for
exercising the right to a jury trial any more than defendants who plead guilty
are penalized because they give up the chance of acquittal at trial. In each instance, the defendant faces a multitude of possible outcomes and freely makes
his choice. Equal protection does not free those who made a bad assessment of
risks or a bad choice from the consequences of their decisions.
439 U.S. at 226.
261. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1968) (defendant cannot be
forced to waive fifth amendment protection in order to receive fourth amendment protection); Groot, supra note 31, at 273.
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ment came in Simmons v. United States, 262 in which the defendant, in
order to obtain standing for a motion to suppress evidence alleged to
have been the product of an illegal search, was required to admit to
ownership of the incriminating evidence. 263 Viewing the collision of the
defendant's fourth amendment right to question the search with his
fifth amendment right to be free of self-incrimination as an intolerable
invasion of constitutional protections, the Court proceeded to evaluate
the issue of compulsion. Since Simmons' testimony at the suppression
hearing was intended to secure for him a benefit, i.e., standing to contest the illegal search, it may well have been only voluntary. Acknowledging that "[a]s an abstract matter,"264 this may have been true, the
Court went on to explain:
A defendant is "compelled" to testify in support of a motion to
suppress only in the sense that if he refrains from testifying he
will have to forego a benefit, and testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given to obtain a
benefit. However, the assumption which underlies this reasoning is that the defendant has a choice: he may refuse to testify
and give up the benefit. When this assumption is applied to a
situation .in which the "benefit" to be gained is that afforded
by another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable tension is created. . . . In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another. 2611
To be sure, the usefulness of the Simmons analysis is limited by
the fact that the entrapment defense has yet to be recognized as a constitutional right. 266 Accordingly, a defendant forced to admit his guilt
in order to claim the defense is not compelled to choose between two
constitutionally equivalent privileges. Yet, while Simmons pointed to
an "intolerable" situation as resulting only from the playing off of one
constitutional right against another, it nonetheless suggested that primary concern was still to be addressed to the overall importance of the
right sacrificed.267 In other words, Simmons may be read as forbidding
a forced trade-off of protections even if one right is not constitutionally
grounded, as long as that right remains at least fundamentally
important. 266
262. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
263. Id. at 391.
264. Id. at 393.
265. Id. at 393-94.
266. For a discussion of the Court's refusal to accord constitutional status to the entrapment defense, see supra notes 51-55 & 249 and accompanying text.
267. 390 U.S. at 393-94.
268. Id.
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Arguing that the policies underlying the entrapment defense are
identical to those supporting the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule, "-prevention of unwarranted governmental intrusion into
the lives of its citizens-,"269 Professor Groot has suggested that there
must then "be a determination as to 'whether compelling the election
impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind [that]
right.' " 270 To the extent the entrapment defense may be equated with
the fourth amendment right, then it seems that a persuasive constitutional argument for rejecting the inconsistency rule may be advanced.
Professor Groot's paralleling of the entrapment defense with the constitutional guarantee of the fourth amendment Hows directly from his
view that it "manifests the same policy [as the fourth amendment] in
protecting each individual's psychic privacy."271 That is to say, "[t]he
government should not have the power . . . to intrude upon a citizen's
mental state in order to suggest or stimulate conduct which is even
questionably prohibited. " 272
Despite the intuitive appeal of Professor Groot's reasoning, the
fact of the matter remains that the Supreme Court has not yet equated
the entrapment defense with any constitutional right. 273 Despite the
ostensibly equivalent policies underlying both doctrines, the defense of
entrapment continues to be regarded as less fundamentally important
than the traditional fourth amendment protections.
While any constitutional proscription therefore seems unlikely,
this does not end the matter entirely. The case for a constitutional pro269. Groot, supra note 31, at 274.
270. Id. (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971)).
271. Groot, supra note 31, at 274 (emphasis added). The fourth amendment is aimed
at the physical privacy of the citizenry, and "was intended to be broader than simply
protecting those suspected of crime; it was designed to protect all citizens from physical
interference." Id.
272. Id. Groot's reading of the entrapment defense as articulated over the years
points to continued references to the mental integrity of the accused. For example, the
Sorrells opinion is replete with language posing the question in terms of whether the
accused was "lured,'' "induced," "instigated,'' or "encouraged" into the criminal activity.
287 U.S. at 441, 442, 444, 445, 448 (1932). His conclusion follows quite naturally that
such "statements must be read only as recognition of the fact that the entrapment defense protects against psychic intrusions by the state." Groot, supra note 31, at 275.
Groot offers a second level on which to view the equivalency of the two doctrines. He
suggests that to the extent both the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and the entrapment defense are directed toward the same two results, "vindication of the individual
and deterrence of similar police conduct," the entrapment defense should "occupy a position very nearly as fundamental as that occupied by the fourth amendment." Id. at
276-77.
273. Indeed, the prospect for any such doctrine seems less than likely. To date, the
furthest the Court has been willing tp go is to suggest the possibility of an entrapmentinduced due process violation, stemming from egregious government conduct. Se.e supra
notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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scription, though failing in its ultimate ambition, is arguably strong
enough to impel a rethinking of the inconsistency rule. Indeed, this
may be particularly so in view of "the belief of modern criminal jurisprudence that a criminal defendant should be accorded every reasonable protection in defending himself against governmental prosecution."274 Clearly, the arguments advanced by the restrictive
jurisdictions in favor of the rule are not marked by any degree of incisive reasoning. 275 When weighed against the near-constitutional concerns discussed above, the better approach becomes apparent. Absent
any cogent support for the continued existence of the rule, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that it must give way to the paramount considerations, those at least bordering on constitutional guarantees,
which speak to its abolition.

B. Fundamental Non-Constitutional Concerns
It will be recalled that our earlier discussion suggested the underlying ambition of civil trials as manifesting a conscious attempt to
bring truth to bear.276 This fundamental policy is unquestionably no
less relevant in the context of the criminal trial. Indeed, "[t]he common goals of all trials, civil and criminal, of issues of fact is to arrive at
the truth...." 277 It would seem then, that any procedural rule directed at or having the effect of impeding the search for truth, is at
cross-purposes with the very system of which it is a part and to which
it owes allegiance. 278 Thus, it has been argued that the "most obvious
evil resulting from the denial-of-crime/no-entrapment rule is prevention of truth determination by the jury."279 It is important to understand that the inconsistency rule subverts the truth-seeking function of
the trial by unreasonably requiring a defendant to present to the jury
only what he believes to be the most credible set of facts available. In
large part, the jury is thereby deprived of the benefit of viewing the
bases for the accused's indictment in their entirety. The defendant
274. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
275. See supra notes 127-52 and accompanying text.
276. For a discussion of the use of inconsistent pleadings in civil actions, see supra
notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
277. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1956) (emphasis added);
accord United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1977) ("the common goal
of all trials of issues of fact is to arrive at the truth"); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d
139, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1965) ("ultimate goal" of criminal trial is ascertainment of truth);
see also Orfield, supra note 17, at 66.
278. For an interesting discussion of the arguably necessary right of a defendant to
present evidence on his behalf, see Imwinkelried, The Constitutional Right to Present
Defense Evidence, 62 Mn.. L. REV. 225 (1973). See also Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605, 612-13 (1972); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
279. Groot, supra note 31, at 268.
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may indeed be guilty; he indeed may not have been entrapped. Yet,
these are both questions rightfully within the province of the jury.280 It
may in fact be suggested that to the extent the issue of entrapment is
committed to jury determination, "as part of [the jury's] function of
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused,"281 it may not, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Sherman, be artfully rerouted via a defendant's forced choice.
The concern is twofold. On the one hand, we are tempted to discount the value of allowing inconsistent defenses where their assertion
is superfluous, that is, where a defendant would be found both guilty
and not entrapped, or conversely, both innocent and entrapped. Retrospectively, in these cases, we are of course correct in reasoning that, as
it turned out, it really didn't matter. Although true, this misses the
point altogether. If a defense is to be of any value, it cannot be premised or its use conditioned on how it will fare in any given case. Precisely because we don't, indeed cannot, know the results beforehand,
the defense must be submitted to the trier of fact. The second concern
poses an even more serious problem. More often than not, the cases
will not be as clear-cut as those outlined above. A defendant may be
both genuinely guilty and yet unquestionably entrapped. Or, one may
be wholly innocent, choose unsuccessfully to argue entrapment, and be
found guilty. At the very least, on an individual level, it would be inequitable to deprive either one of these two hypothetical defendants as
complete an opportunity as possible to defend themselves.282 Though
in terms of substantive legal rules, each would be deemed innocent,
procedural myopia obscures any such result. Classically, the inconsistency rule ignores the forest for the trees. Ostensibly concerned with
eliciting truth, the rule is seemingly oblivious to its counterproductivity. Not only does it automatically and arbitrarily preclude important
issues of fact from ever seeing the light of judicial day, and thereby
inhibit informed decisionmaking, but it also engenders defendant dishonesty. By requiring a defendant to choose the most probably successful horn of an intractable dilemma, the rule instructs him both to
remain silent as to possibly exculpatory testimony and to "create" that
280. Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring), quoted supra in text accompanying note
32, it has been conclusively established that "unless it can be decided as a matter of law,
the issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is for the jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused." Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958) (footnote omitted). Of course, the jury must receive proper instructions from the trial judge who himself is entitled to "comment fairly upon the entrapment evidence." Or.field, supra note 17, at 67.
281. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1957).
282. Cf. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane), quoted
supra in text accompanying note 274.
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testimony which will not be inconsistent with his chosen defense. 283
Admittedly, condoning a Janus-like posture may in some cases reward the defendant who is now entitled to present at least two sets of
incongruent facts. That is to say, allowing inconsistent defenses effectively sanctions a mendacious defendant's utterance of what he well
knows to be an untruth, at least in those instances where a defendant
claims entrapment despite acknowledging to himself his own guilt. 284
Still, this is a gratuitous concern. First, it is important to realize that
despite the possibility of a defendant's less than honest recital, a defendant must always be entitled to present his case to a jury. Certainly
none would advocate selectively preempting the jury's opportunity to
evaluate testimony perceived by the judge or prosecution to be a priori
unbelievable, yet this is precisely what supporters of the inconsistency
rule seem to have in mind. When reduced to its essentials, a trial itself
represents little more than a forum in which competing claimants vie
for the favor of the jurors. Of necessity, each side is impelled to allegations. and responses in direct conflict with one another. Seldom is the
case where absolute truth may be found in both parties' positions. The
trial, therefore, pits these opposing forces one against the other for no
other purpose than to discover the truth. Indeed, the inherent polarity
which is engendered is reasonably viewed more as a tool of the truth
discovery process than as an evil to be eschewed. To the extent inconsistency remains an inherent, indeed integral, part of the trial process,
our concerns inevitably prove to be unwarranted.
Yet another reason exists which serves to dispel any irrational
fears of inconsistency and leaves the basis for these concerns all but
evaporated. It is not to be forgotten that an essential safeguard built
into the criminal trial is the court's perjury sanction. Although the effectiveness of such a safeguard may be called into question, it arguably
remains as effective a deterrent to the defendant who seeks to argue
inconsistent defenses as it does to any criminal defendant. 2811 In any
event, it seems the more reasonable approach to permit the jury to
hear all the evidence available on any and all defenses and to make
their own determination as to the ultimate truth. To arbitrarily with283. Professor Groot has observed that "[i]n fact, the inconsistency rule may even
force a defendant into perjury. An accused who is not factually guilty of crime may admit guilt because of a tactical decision that entrapment is his better defense." Groot,
supra note 31, at 269.
284. This may not always be the case, however. Certainly a situation may arise where
a defendant is both factually innocent and also entrapped.
285. Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971) (illegally obtained confession, not admissible in case-in-chief, is admissible to impeach defendant's testimony;
privilege to testify does not include right to commit perjury); Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (use of illegally obtained evidence is admissible to impeach defendant's testimony; a defendant may not resort to perjurious testimony).
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hold evidence from the jury the defense on the grounds that a priori it
logically cannot be true is to ignore the fact that any defense, even
when offered singly, may also be false. To the extent we have chosen to
deal with this situation through the court-imposed perjury sanction, we
are committed to a like resort in the case of inconsistent defenses in
the interest of letting the jury decide. Any other course will effectively
impede the ability of the jury to properly resolve a given case.
A related issue, advanced by proponents of the rule, is that permitting inconsistent defenses will inevitably tend to confuse a jury.286
While in its most general sense this may well be true, the more important question is whether such confusion will unduly interfere with the
jury's ultimate findings. Doubtless, jurors will be somewhat baffled by
a defendant who speaks simultaneously from both sides of his mouth,
and this certainly poses a calculated risk to any defendant who avails
himself of such a strategy.287 Yet, clear instructions from the bench
might well minimize the degree of any such confusion and preserve the
right of the defendant to make such a choice.
V.

CONCLUSION

On balance, it appears that the law of entrapment is far less settled than observers might have surmised. Despite repeated pronouncements of the Supreme Court as to the substantive components of the
defense, much remains to be spoken on the subtleties surrounding the
procedures by which the defense may be invoked. Ironically, inconsistency has bred inconsistency; the divisive split among the circuits concerning the defense's availability to a non-admitting defendant has fostered both confusion and less than equal justice. Most troubling,
perhaps, is the failure of a number of the circuits to provide any more
than cursory analysis in their haste to reject the inconsistent entrapment defense. Such abdication of judicial responsibility has served only
to perpetuate a logically unfounded and precedentially unsupportable
rule. In light of what appears to be the growing importance the entrapment defense has come to assume, 288 a thorough reevaluation of the
rule may well be in order. To the extent the rule retains staunch support in some jurisdictions, and has been thoroughly discredited in
others, the time seems ripe for the Supreme Court to delve further into
286. See Note, supra note 259, at 923; see also United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d
535, 542 (5th Cir. 1978); Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954). But
see People v. De Rosa, 378 ill. 557, 563, 39 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1941); People v. Jersky, 377 ill.
261, 267, 36 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1941) (defendant entitled to inconsistent defenses even if
offered for "express purpose of confusing the jury").
287. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
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the entrapment controversy and delineate more fully the parameters of
its use.
In the absence of any articulable persuasive support for the retention of the inconsistency rule, it is submitted that the most reasonable
course calls for the rule's abandonment. As little more than a jurisprudentially antiquated doctrine whose pernicious effects find no countervailing benefits, the rule proves an ill-fitting, incompatible partner with
the very functioning of the criminal trial. As unpalatable a morsel contradictory defense positions may seem at first blush, there is comfort to
be found in the words of Emerson, who recognized that "[a] foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds...." 289
Michael H. Ro/fer
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